DOB: Poppin Kettle Franchising et al - Findings & Order

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IN THE MATTER OF:

POPPIN KETTLE
FRANCHISING, INC. 

CHRIS T. GREGORIS
a/k/a CHRISTOS T. GREGORIS
a/k/a CHRISTOPHER GREGORIS

YOFRESH YOGURTS
FRANCHISING, INC.  

(Collectively "Respondents")

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FINDINGS OF FACT

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

AND ORDER

DOCKET NO.
CF-14-886-B

INTRODUCTION

The Banking Commissioner (“Commissioner”) is charged with the administration of Chapter 672c, Sections 36b-60 to 36b-80, inclusive, of the Connecticut General Statutes, the Connecticut Business Opportunity Investment Act (“Act”).

The above-referenced matter was initiated upon charges brought by the Commissioner to issue a permanent order to cease and desist against Poppin Kettle Franchising, Inc. (“Poppin Kettle”), Chris T. Gregoris a/k/a Christos T. Gregoris a/k/a Christopher Gregoris (“Gregoris”) and YoFresh Yogurts Franchising, Inc. (“YoFresh Yogurts”) and impose a fine upon each Respondent.  On June 12, 2014, the Commissioner issued an Order to Cease and Desist, Notice of Intent to Fine and Notice of Right to Hearing against Respondents (“Notice”).

The Notice alleges that Respondents offered and/or sold Poppin Kettle and YoFresh Yogurts business opportunities absent registration under the Act, in violation of Section 36b-67(1) of the Act and that the conduct of Poppin Kettle and Gregoris constitutes, in connection with the offer or sale of a business opportunity, directly or indirectly omitting to state a material fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in the light of the circumstances under which they are made, not misleading, in violation of Section 36b-67(6) of the Act.

On July 8, 2014, Respondents requested a hearing.  After due notice, a hearing was held at the Department of Banking (“Department”) on September 17, 2014.  The hearing was conducted in accordance with Chapter 54 of the Connecticut General Statutes, the “Uniform Administrative Procedure Act”, and the Department’s contested case regulations, Sections 36a-1-19 to 36a-1-57, inclusive, of the Regulations of Connecticut State Agencies.

Having read the entire record, including testimony of the witnesses and documentary evidence, I make the following findings of fact and conclusions of law based on the preponderance of evidence in the record.

FINDINGS OF FACT

  
Procedural Findings
  
1. On June 12, 2014, the Commissioner issued an Order to Cease and Desist, Notice of Intent to Fine and Notice of Right to Hearing against Respondents.  (HO Ex. 1; Tr. at 7.)
2. On July 8, 2014, the Department received a written request for a hearing from Gregoris on behalf of Respondents.  (HO Ex. 2; Tr. at 7-8.)
3. On July 9, 2014, the Commissioner appointed Attorney Stacey Serrano as Hearing Officer.  (HO Ex. 1.)
4. On July 14, 2014, the Hearing Officer continued the hearing in the matter from July 24, 2014 to September 17, 2014.  (HO Ex. 3; Tr. at 8.)
5. The hearing was held on September 17, 2014.  (Tr. at 4.)
6. Attorney Elena Zweifler appeared at the hearing on behalf of the Department.  (Tr. at 4.)
7. Gregoris appeared at the hearing on behalf of all Respondents.  (Tr. at 5.)
  
    
Matters Asserted
    
8. Poppin Kettle was in the business of selling Poppin Kettle business opportunities and is currently dissolved.  (Tr. at 21, 77, 78.)  Poppin Kettle sold flavored popcorn.  (Tr. at 22.)
9. Gregoris was the owner of Poppin Kettle.  (Tr. at 22, 77.)  Gregoris was also the owner, President, Treasurer, Secretary and Director of Java’s Brewin Development Inc. (“Java”).  (Tr. at 24-26, 81; Dept. Ex. 2.)  Java sold coffee shops.  (Tr. at 24.)
10. Java was dissolved by the State of Massachusetts on June 18, 2012 due to its failure to renew with the State.  (Tr. at 27; Dept. Ex. 2.)
11. In 2008, the Commissioner issued an Order to Cease and Desist and Order Imposing Fine against Java for the offer and sale of unregistered business opportunities.  (Tr. at 24, 29; Dept. Exs. 3A, 3B and 3C.)  The fine was never paid to the Department.  (Tr. at 30.)
12. Poppin Kettle advertised its website on Craigslist.  The website was created by Gregoris and offered “new licensed stores, kiosks and carts in Connecticut” and assistance with site location, lease negotiations, and in-store training for Poppin Kettle business opportunities.  (Tr. at 30-33; Dept. Ex. 4.)
13. There was a Poppin Kettle kiosk at the Meriden Mall, Meriden, Connecticut.  (Tr. at 32-33, 36, 72; Dept. Exs. 4, 5.)
14. In May 2013, Poppin Kettle sold a business opportunity to a Connecticut resident for $19,500 (“Connecticut Resident”).  (Tr. at 34, 37-38, 43, 65; Dept. Exs. 6, 8, 14.)
15. The Connecticut Resident became aware of Poppin Kettle business opportunities by doing research on the Internet.  (Tr. at 69.)
16. Gregoris, on behalf of Poppin Kettle, executed a Franchise Agreement with the Connecticut resident effective May 22, 2013.  (Dept. Ex. 8.)
17. The Connecticut Resident received the Franchise Agreement and Franchise Disclosure Document prior to his purchase of Poppin Kettle.  (Tr. at 49, 71, 73; Dept. Exs. 8, 9.)
18. Poppin Kettle’s Franchise Disclosure Document (“Franchise Disclosure Document”) did not contain information regarding the business experience of its owners, including that Gregoris had been involved in Java.  (Tr. at 53-55; Dept. Ex. 9.)
19. The Franchise Disclosure Document did not mention the Order to Cease and Desist and Order Imposing Fine issued against Java by the Banking Commissioner.  (Tr. at 57-58; Dept. Ex. 9.)
20. The Franchise Disclosure Document did not discuss any risks, nor did it have a risk disclosure section.  (Tr. at 59-60; Dept. Ex. 9.)
21. Poppin Kettle was never registered as a business opportunity in Connecticut.  (Tr. at 61; Dept. Ex. 11.)
22. It was the Connecticut Resident’s understanding that he would receive assistance in finding a location for the Poppin Kettle store, designing and formatting the store, training, support and ongoing assistance.  (Tr. at 72.)
23. The Connecticut Resident received training, lease negotiations and everything that had been promised in connection with his purchase of Poppin Kettle.  (Tr. at 74-75.)
24. The Connecticut Resident was unaware of Gregoris’ involvement in Java at the time he purchased the business opportunity from Poppin Kettle.  (Tr. at 73.)
25. Gregoris met with the Connecticut Resident in Connecticut at least once to discuss Poppin Kettle.  (Tr. at 84-85, 89-90.)
26. The Connecticut Resident failed to recall discussing the risks involved in purchasing a business opportunity with Gregoris.  (Tr. at 74-75.)
27. Gregoris is currently employed by and the sole owner of YoFresh Yogurts.  (Tr. at 76.)
28. Via Craigslist, YoFresh Yogurts offered business opportunities in Connecticut and assistance with site location, lease negotiations and in-store training.  (Tr. at 39-42; Dept. Exs. 7A, 7B.)  YoFresh Yogurts offered frozen yogurt stores.  (Tr. at 41.)
29. Gregoris represented that there were no sales of the YoFresh Yogurts business opportunity to Connecticut residents.  (Dept. Ex. 14.)
30. YoFresh Yogurts was never registered as a business opportunity in Connecticut.  (Tr. 61; Dept. Ex. 12.)

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

The Commissioner is charged with the administration of Chapter 672c, Sections 36b-60 to 36b-80, inclusive, of the Connecticut General Statutes, the Connecticut Business Opportunity Investment Act.  The Commissioner’s authority includes the power to issue orders to cease and desist against Poppin Kettle, Gregoris and YoFresh Yogurts, individually, pursuant to Section 36b-72(a) of the Act, and impose fines upon Poppin Kettle, Gregoris and YoFresh Yogurts, individually, pursuant to Section 36b-72(b) of the Act.

Standard of Evidence

The applicable standard of proof in Connecticut administrative cases, including those involving fraud and severe sanctions, is the preponderance of the evidence standard.  Goldstar Medical Services v. Department of Social Services, 288 Conn. 790, 819 (2008).  “[I]t is the exclusive province of the trier of fact to make determinations of credibility, crediting some, all, or none of a given witness’ testimony . . . .  [A]n agency [is not] required to use in any particular fashion any of the materials presented to it as long as the conduct of the hearing is fundamentally fair.”  Id. at 830 (internal citations omitted).

“Review of an administrative agency decision requires a court to determine whether there is substantial evidence in the administrative record to support the agency’s findings of basic fact and whether the conclusions drawn from those facts are reasonable.”  Id. at 833.  “An administrative finding is supported by substantial evidence if the record affords a substantial basis of fact from which the fact in issue can be reasonably inferred.”  Id.  “There is no distinction between direct and circumstantial evidence so far as probative force is concerned . . . .  In fact, circumstantial evidence may be more certain, satisfying and persuasive than direct evidence.”  Id. at 834 (internal citations omitted).

Alleged Violations of the Connecticut
Business Opportunity Investment Act

1. The Department alleges that Respondents offered and/or sold Poppin Kettle and YoFresh Yogurts business opportunities absent registration, in violation of Section 36b-67(1) of the Act.
 
Section 36b-67(1) of the Act states, in pertinent part, that:

   No person shall in connection with the sale or offer for sale of a business opportunity:  (1) Sell or offer for sale a business opportunity in this state or from this state unless it has first been registered with the commissioner and declared effective by the commissioner in accordance with the provisions of section 36b-62 . . . .
At the outset, it must be determined whether Poppin Kettle and YoFresh Yogurts constituted business opportunities under the Act.  In particular, the Notice alleges that Poppin Kettle and YoFresh Yogurts constituted business opportunities as a result of Gregoris, Poppin Kettle and YoFresh Yogurts representing that they would provide purchaser-investors with a sales program or a marketing program within the meaning of Section 36b-61(2)(D) of the Act.
  
Section 36b-61(2) of the Act states in pertinent part:

   “Business opportunity” means the sale or lease, or offer for sale or lease, of any product, equipment, supply or service which is sold or offered for sale to the purchaser-investor for the purpose of enabling the purchaser-investor to start a business, and in which the seller represents that: . . . (D) the seller will provide a sales program or marketing program to the purchaser-investor, provided sections 36b-60 to 36b-80, inclusive, shall not apply to the sale of a marketing program made in conjunction with the licensing of a registered trademark or service mark . . . .
  
  The terms “sales program” and “marketing program” are not further defined within the Act and have not been construed by Connecticut courts in such context.  However, this Department has issued guidance on their meaning.  In an opinion issued on July 31, 1990, published on the Department’s website and in the CCH Business Franchise Guide  5070.2, the Department took the position that the terms “sales program” or “marketing program” mean “advice or training pertaining to the sale of any products, equipment, supplies or services which advice or training is provided to the purchaser-investor by the seller or a person recommended by the seller, and which includes but is not limited to, preparing and providing (1) promotional literature, brochures, pamphlets or advertising materials; (2) training regarding the promotion, operation or management of the business opportunity, or (3) operational, managerial, technical or financial guidelines or assistance.”
 
  The evidence demonstrates that, indeed, sellers of Poppin Kettle provided purchaser-investors with advertising materials, training and operational assistance.
  
  For example, the Franchise Agreement for Poppin Kettle executed by Gregoris and the Connecticut Resident provides, in pertinent part, that:

 6.1  Operational Manual.  We will loan you one copy of our confidential operations and training manual (“Operations Manual”).  You shall operate the Franchised Business in strict compliance with the Operations Manual . . . .
 
6.4 Pre-opening Advertising.  We will help you select media purchases for and to schedule your grand opening campaign.  We will provide graphic designs, layouts and written copy for advertisements which you may use . . . .
6.5 Opening Assistance.  One of our representatives will be present prior to and/or following the opening of your Franchised Business to assist you in pre-opening and post-opening matters.  This representative will stay . . . to assist you with the hiring and training of your employees, inspect the placement and testing of your equipment and decor items, assist you with inventory ordering and preparation, execution of services and assisting you with the initial operation of your Franchised Business.
 
6.6 Ongoing Assistance.  We will provide you continuing consultation and advice as we deem necessary and appropriate regarding the management and operation of the Franchised Business. . . .
  
7.7.4   You agree to conduct the Franchised Business in accordance with the Training Manual.  You shall immediately train and instruct your employees in accordance with the Training Manual, and shall continue such training and instruction as long as each employee is employed.  The Training Manuals shall set forth the practices, procedures and methods to be utilized in your Franchised Business, and we may require you to conform your practices with national programs which we have designed and promulgated as part of our Franchise System. . . .
  
8.1 Initial Training Program.  You and (2) of your key employees shall attend, and complete to our satisfaction, our initial training program . . . .  The required training lasts up to 7 days and shall consist of training in merchandising, cleaning of equipment, preparation of goods, product assembly, recipes, office procedures, advertising, inventory control, basic techniques of management and skills. . . .
  
  
Dept. Ex. 8; see also, Tr. at 47.
 
  In addition, the Craigslist advertisement for Poppin Kettle offers in-store training and the Connecticut Resident testified that he received training, support and ongoing assistance in connection with his purchase of Poppin Kettle.  Likewise, the Craigslist advertisement for YoFresh Yogurts offered in-store training.  As a result, sellers of both Poppin Kettle and YoFresh Yogurts represented that sales programs or marketing programs would be provided to purchaser-investors, constituting “business opportunities” within the meaning of Section 36b-61(2)(D).
 
  Next, it must be determined whether offers or sales of Poppin Kettle and YoFresh Yogurts occurred within the meaning of Section 36b-67(1) of the Act.  The terms “sale” and “offer” are further defined by the Act.
 
  Section 36b-61(7) of the Act provides:

   (A)  “Sale” or “sell” includes every contract of sale of, contract to sell, or disposition of a business opportunity or interest in a business opportunity for value; (B) “offer” or “offer to sell” includes every attempt or offer to dispose of, or solicitation of an offer to buy, a business opportunity or interest in a business opportunity for value.  Nothing in this subdivision shall limit or diminish the full meaning of the terms “sale”, “sell”, “offer” or “offer to sell” as construed by the courts of this state[.] 
  
   Both Poppin Kettle and YoFresh Yogurts business opportunities were offered via the Internet on Craigslist, and one Poppin Kettle business opportunity was sold to the Connecticut Resident.  Gregoris clearly participated in the sale of Poppin Kettle by assisting in the development of its website, discussing the business opportunity with the Connecticut Resident and executing the Franchise Agreement.  The record is less clear about Gregoris’ involvement in the offer of YoFresh Yogurts.  Neither business opportunity was registered in Connecticut and no evidence was produced supporting a claim of exemption or exclusion.  As a result, Poppin Kettle, Gregoris and YoFresh Yogurts offered business opportunities in violation of Section 36b-67(1) of the Act and Gregoris and Poppin Kettle sold a business opportunity in violation of Section 36b-67(1) of the Act.
  
2. The Department alleges that the conduct of Poppin Kettle and Gregoris, constitutes, in connection with the offer or sale of a business opportunity, directly or indirectly omitting to state a material fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in the light of the circumstances under which they are made, not misleading, in violation of Section 36b-67(6) of the Act.
 
   Section 36b-67(6) of the Act, states in pertinent part, that:

   No person shall in connection with the sale or offer for sale of a business opportunity: … (6) directly or indirectly …(B) make any untrue statement of a material fact or omit to state a material fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in the light of the circumstances under which they are made, not misleading . . . .
 
 
  In particular, the Department alleged that Poppin Kettle failed to provide the Connecticut Resident with the disclosure statement containing the disclosures required by Section 36b-63 of the Act, including key information on the franchise, the seller and its principals and affiliates, risks associated with the purchase of the business opportunity, financial information on the seller, and relevant employment, disciplinary and litigation histories of the seller and its principals.  The Department also alleged that Poppin Kettle and Gregoris failed to disclose to the Connecticut Resident, among other things, that Gregoris was a control person of Java, which was the subject of a Cease and Desist Order entered by the Commissioner on June 23, 2008, for violations of the Act; that on October 8, 2008, the Commissioner imposed a $30,000 fine against Java for the same violations of the Acts and that such fine remains unpaid.
 
  This Department has previously relied on federal securities laws to guide its interpretation of the business opportunity anti-fraud statutes.  In Matter of:  Silver Shots, decided on October 25, 1995, the Commissioner applied the following federal standards in his interpretation of “material” and “misleading” within the meaning of Section 36b-67(6):

  
Under federal securities law, a “material” fact is a fact that a reasonable investor might have considered important in the making of the investment decision.  See Affiliated Ute Citizens v. United States, 406 U.S. 128, 153-154, (1972); Gruber v. Prudential-Bache Securities, Inc., 679 F. Supp. 165, 176 (D. Conn. 1987).  A fact is material if there is a substantial likelihood that its disclosure would have been considered significant by a reasonable investor.  Basic, Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH)  93,645, pp. 97,945-97,947 (1988); TSC Industries, Inc. v. Northway, Inc., 426 U.S. 438, Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH)  95,615, pp. 90,069-90,070 (1976). . . .
 
[A] material fact is “misleading” if it adversely affects the reliability of other statements.  See Ross v. A.H. Robins Co., Inc., Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH)  96,388, p. 93,353. (S.D.N.Y. 1978).
  
Matter of:  Silver Shots, 1995 WL 803386 (1995), at *5-6.
 
  Applying this standard in the Matter of:  Silver Shots, the Commissioner found, among other items, that the failure to disclose risk factors to purchaser-investors constituted an omission of a material fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in the light of the circumstances under which they were made, not misleading for purposes of Section 36b-67(6) of the Act.
  
  Federal securities law also advises that failure to disclose information required to be disclosed by law gives rise to omissions of material facts.  See, e.g., Morgan Stanley Information Fund Securities Litigation, 592 F.3d 347 (2010).  Poppin Kettle and Gregoris omitted information required to be disclosed pursuant to Section 36b-63, such as Gregoris’ previous experience with Java, the 2008 Order to Cease and Desist and Order Imposing Fine issued by the Commissioner against Java and a “risk factors” section.
 
  Pursuant to Section 36b-63(c) of the Act, disclosure documents must contain:

  
(2)  The business experience during the past five years of each of the seller’s current directors, executive officers, trustees, general partners, general managers, and any other persons charged with responsibility for the seller’s business activities, including but not limited to, the chief operating officer and the financial, marketing, training and service officers. . . .
 
(4)  A statement disclosing who, if any, of such persons listed in subdivisions (1) and (2) of this subsection: . . . (C) is subject to any currently effective state or federal agency or court injunctive or restrictive order, is a party to a proceeding currently pending in which such order is sought, or is or was a principal, director, executive officer or partner of any other person that is subject to such order or is a party to any such currently pending proceeding relating to or affecting business opportunity activities or the seller-purchaser-investor relationship . . . . [and]
 
(27)  A section entitled “risk factors” containing a series of short concise captioned paragraphs summarizing the principal factors which make the business opportunity one of high risk or of a speculative nature.  Such factors shall include, but not be limited to: . . . any adverse background information regarding executive officers and directors of the seller, including prior business failures . . . .
  
  By failing to disclose this required information, Poppin Kettle and Gregoris omitted material facts necessary in order to make statements made, in the light of the circumstances under which they were made, not misleading, in violation of Section 36b-67(6) of the Act.
  
 
Authority to Issue Order to Cease and Desist and Impose Fine
  
  Section 36b-72 of the Act provides, in pertinent part, that:

  
(a)  Whenever it appears to the commissioner, after an investigation, that any person or persons have violated, are violating or are about to violate any of the provisions of sections 36b-60 to 36b-80, inclusive, or any regulation, rule or order adopted or issued under said sections or that a further sale or offer to sell would constitute a violation of said sections, or any such regulation, rule or order, the commissioner may order the person or persons to cease and desist from the violations of the provisions of said sections or any such regulations, rules or orders or from further sale or offering to sell business opportunities constituting or which would constitute a violation of the provisions of said sections or any such regulations, rules or orders.  After any such order is issued, the person or persons named in such order may, within fourteen days after receipt of the order, file a written request for a hearing.  Such hearing shall be held in accordance with the provisions of chapter 54.
 
(b) (1)  Whenever the commissioner finds as the result of an investigation that any person has violated any of the provisions of sections 36b-60 to 36b-80, inclusive, or any regulation, rule or order adopted or issued under said sections, the commissioner may send a notice to such person by certified mail, return receipt requested, or by any express delivery carrier that provides a dated delivery receipt.  The notice shall be deemed received by the person on the earlier of the date of actual receipt or the date seven days after the date on which such notice was mailed or sent.  Any such notice shall include:  (A) A reference to the title, chapter, regulation, rule or order alleged to have been violated; (B) a short and plain statement of the matter asserted or charged; (C) the maximum fine that may be imposed for such violation; (D) a statement indicating that such person may file a written request for a hearing on the matters asserted not later than fourteen days after receipt of the notice; and (E) the time and place for the hearing.
 
(2)  If a hearing is requested within the time specified in the notice, the commissioner shall hold a hearing upon the charges made unless such person fails to appear at the hearing.  Such hearing shall be held in accordance with the provisions of chapter 54.  After the hearing if the commissioner finds that the person has violated any of the provisions of sections 36b-60 to 36b-80, inclusive, or any regulation, rule or order adopted or issued under said sections, the commissioner may, in addition to any other remedy authorized by said sections, order that a fine not exceeding one hundred thousand dollars per violation be imposed upon such person.  If such person fails to appear at the hearing, the commissioner may, as the facts require, order that a fine not exceeding one hundred thousand dollars per violation be imposed upon such person.  The commissioner shall send a copy of any order issued pursuant to this subsection by certified mail, return receipt requested, or by any express delivery carrier that provides a dated delivery receipt, to any person named in such order.
  
 
Notice and Public Interest
  
Section 4-177 of the Connecticut General Statutes provides, in pertinent part, that:

  
(a)  In a contested case, all parties shall be afforded an opportunity for hearing after reasonable notice.
 
(b)  The notice shall be in writing and shall include:  (1) A statement of the time, place, and nature of the hearing; (2) a statement of the legal authority and jurisdiction under which the hearing is to be held; (3) a reference to the particular sections of the statutes and regulations involved; and (4) a short and plain statement of the matters asserted. . . . 
  
  The Notice issued by the Commissioner complied with Sections 36b-72(a) and 36b-72(b) of the Act and Section 4-177 of the Connecticut General Statutes.
 
  This case exemplifies disclosure issues meant to be addressed by the passage of the Connecticut Business Opportunity Investment Act.  The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit has stated:

  
The Business Opportunity Investment Act was “enacted with the purpose of preventing the misrepresentations and fraudulent practices involved in business opportunity investment sales and the financial losses and hardships to investors which result therefrom.”  Woolf, The Connecticut Business Opportunity Investment Act, 54 Conn.B.J. 415, 415 (1980).  Its requirements include . . . disclosure of information to prospective purchasers to enable them to make a rational purchase decision . . . .
 
Eye Associates, P.C. v. IncomRx Sys. Ltd. P’ship, 912 F.2d 23, 25-26 (2d Cir. 1990).
 
  Without full disclosure and knowledge of Poppin Kettle’s risk factors and Gregoris’ previous business experience, the Connecticut Resident was unable to make an informed purchase decision.  The failure by Poppin Kettle and Gregoris to comply with the Act’s disclosure obligations and the failure by Poppin Kettle, YoFresh Yogurts and Gregoris to register business opportunities that were offered or sold in Connecticut represent conduct deserving to be deterred and duly sanctioned.
 
  Therefore, I conclude that it is necessary and appropriate in the public interest and for the protection of purchaser-investors and consistent with the purposes fairly intended by the policy and provisions of Sections 36b-60 to 36b-80, inclusive, of the Act to enter the following order.

  ORDER

Having read the record, I hereby ORDER, pursuant to Sections 36b-72(a) and 36b-72(b) of the Act, that:

1. The Order to Cease and Desist issued against Poppin Kettle Franchising, Inc., on June 12, 2014, be made PERMANENT;
  
2. The Order to Cease and Desist issued against Chris T. Gregoris a/k/a Christos T. Gregoris a/k/a Christopher Gregoris on June 12, 2014, be made PERMANENT;
  
3.
The Order to Cease and Desist issued against YoFresh Yogurts Franchising, Inc., on June 12, 2014, be made PERMANENT;
  
4. A FINE of Seventy-Five Thousand Dollars ($75,000) be imposed against Poppin Kettle Franchising, Inc. and Chris T. Gregoris a/k/a Christos T. Gregoris a/k/a Christopher Gregoris, jointly and severally, to be remitted to the Department of Banking by cashier’s check, certified check or money order, made payable to “Treasurer, State of Connecticut”, no later than thirty (30) days after the date the Order is mailed;
  
5. A FINE of Ten Thousand Dollars ($10,000) be imposed against YoFresh Yogurts Franchising, Inc., to be remitted to the Department of Banking by cashier’s check, certified check or money order, made payable to “Treasurer, State of Connecticut”, no later than thirty (30) days after the date the Order is mailed; and
  
6. This Order shall become effective when mailed.



Dated at Hartford, Connecticut,       _____/s/_________________
this 27th day of February 2015.      Bruce H. Adams
         Acting Banking Commissioner 



This Order was sent by certified mail,
return receipt requested, to
Respondent Gregoris on behalf
of all Respondents and
hand delivered to Elena Zweifler, Esq.,
on February 27, 2015.

Chris Gregoris 
8 Faneuil Hall Marketplace, 3rd Floor
Boston, MA 02109
Certified Mail No. 7013 3020 0000 4226 9746
  


Administrative Orders and Settlements