CHRO: 8330054, Dacey - Decision

8330054, Dacey - Decision

CASE NO. 8330054

Commission on Human Rights and Opportunities, ex rel.
Roberta A. Dacey, Complainant

v.

The Borough of Naugatuck, Respondents

AUGUST 10, 1999

MEMORANDUM OF DECISION

I. Procedural History

The present matter commenced with the filing of a Complaint Affidavit by the Complainant, Roberta A. Dacey 1 dated August 26, 1982 with the Commission on Human Rights and Opportunities (hereinafter, "Commission"). Commission Exhibit 1. Said Complaint set forth allegations of discrimination by Respondents,2 the Borough of Naugatuck, the Board of Burgesses, the Mayor and the Police Commission, based upon age and sex. Specifically, it was alleged that Respondent denied Complainant the opportunity to apply for employment as a police officer by reason of her age, which was thirty-six (36) and her sex, female.

A public hearing on this matter was held on April 29, April 30, June 4 and June 5, 1992 with Hearing Officer Heagney presiding in accordance with General Statutes ß 4-77 governing contested cases. The elements of relief sought by Complainantís Prayer for Relief dated September 2, 1992 were back pay, legal interest on back pay, the value of fringe benefits, compensation for emotional distress and pain and suffering, attorneysí fees and costs, and an amendment to the "Rules and Regulations Governing the Police Department of the Borough of Naugatuck".

On March 2, 1993, Hearing Officer Heagney issued a Memorandum of Decision and found in favor of the Complainant with regards to age discrimination, but dismissed the claim for sex discrimination. Hearing Officer Heagney ordered relief, which included back pay as a supernumerary police officer only. Memorandum of Decision, March 2, 1993.

Thereafter, the Complainant and Commission filed an appeal to the Superior Court pursuant to General Statutes ßß 46a-94a and 4-183. On appeal, Judge Maloney, found the issues in favor of the Complainant and remanded this case to the Commission for further proceedings. Commission on Human Rights and Opportunities, ex rel. Roberta A. Dacey v. The Borough of Naugatuck, et al., Superior Court, judicial district of Hartford-New Britain at Hartford, Docket No. CV-93-0523991 (May 13, 1994). The dismissal of the sex discrimination claim was undisturbed by the decision.

Thereafter, the decision of the Superior Court was appealed to the Appellate Court by the Respondents, Clerk of the Borough of Naugatuck, et al. Roberta Dacey v. Commission on Human Rights and Opportunities, et al., 41 Conn. App. 1 (April 9, 1996). The Appellate Courtís decision was rendered on April 9, 1996 and found that as the Superior Courtís remand order "directs the CHRO to make further evidentiary findings", that the administrative ruling was thus incomplete and, therefore, "not ripe for final judicial adjudication." Id at 7. The Appellate Court thus dismissed the appeal before it, which left the remand order of the Superior Court, Maloney, J., in operative effect.

Thereafter on May 3, 1996, Hearing Officer Heagney issued a Scheduling Order for appropriate briefing. On July 19, 1996, Respondents filed a Motion to Dismiss, which was denied on August 29, 1996. After all briefs were filed, Hearing Officer Heagney rendered the Memorandum of Decision on Remand dated June 20, 1997. Both parties appealed from that decision. The Commission filed Motions to Dismiss the appeals because the issue of damages was still not determined. The Court, Vertefeuille, J., denied Commissionís Motions to Dismiss and granted Commissionís Motion to Consolidate the appeals. Commissionís Memorandum, December 10, 1997. On April 15, 1999, Judge Hartmere granted Commissionís Motion to Remand the consolidated appeals.

II. Remand

Regarding the first appeal in this matter, on May 13, 1994, Superior Court Judge Maloney sustained the Complainantís appeal and remanded the case to the Commissionís Hearing Officer for further proceedings. The issue on appeal was whether the Hearing Officer had erroneously imposed the burden of proving the likelihood of employment as a full-time "regular" police officer upon the Complainant and hence, had found that she would not have been offered a full-time "regular" police officer position.

The Superior Court, Maloney, J., agreed with the Complainant and Commissionís position, finding that once discrimination had been found in the failure to hire the Complainant as a supernumerary police officer, the burden thereafter should have shifted to the Respondents to prove "[they] would not have hired the plaintiff as a full-time police officer during the period beginning when she first applied for a job in 1982 to 1985,3 when the position of supernumerary was abolished." Commission on Human Rights and Opportunities, ex rel. Roberta A. Dacey v. The Borough of Naugatuck, et al., Supra, Superior Court, Docket No. CV-93-0523991. Though the position taken on appeal was not one advanced by the Commission or the Complainant during the course of the proceedings in this matter, Judge Maloneyís Remand Order is specific that the evidence of the record "makes it impossible for the defendants to sustain their burden of proving that the plaintiff would not have been hired as a full-time police officer before the supernumerary position was abolished." Id. at 6. Thus the Court, in remanding the case, placed three issues before Hearing Officer Heagney. The first, when the Complainant would have been hired as a supernumerary police officer; second, when the Complainant would have been hired as a full-time "regular" police officer; and the third, how much back pay is Complainant entitled to receive as a result. Id.

Hearing Officer Heagney found the following facts on remand, Memorandum of Decision on Remand, June 20, 1997: that the Complainant would have completed the testing, medical examination and interview after June 1, 1982; Commission Exhibit 6; that she would have been hired on or about November 1, 1983 as a supernumerary police officer to the Borough of Naugatuck Police Department; Commission Exhibit 6; that the Complainant would have been offered the position of a full-time "regular" police officer of the Borough of Naugatuck Police Department on or about May 1, 1985; Commission Exhibit 6; and that the Complainant would have received the wages and benefits of a full-time "regular" police officer of the Naugatuck Police Force from May 1, 1985 to and through March 2, 1993. See Memorandum of the Commission, June 3, 1996 at 8-10, Fact 21. Hearing Officer Heagney ordered the Respondents to pay to the Complainant an amount equal to Complainantís lost back pay as a supernumerary police officer from November 1, 1983 through April 30, 1985 and as a full-time "regular" police officer of Respondents from May 1, 1985 through March 2, 1993 by utilizing Officer Dennis Lockeís actual wages as Complainantís assumed wages. Hearing Officer Heagney also ordered that Respondents pay to Complainant an amount equal to the unreimbursed medical or dental expenses incurred by Complainant. All of this was to be accomplished by having the parties meet to exchange information.

Commission filed a Motion to Remand the consolidated appeals, which were filed after Hearing Officer Heagneyís June 20, 1997 decision. The Motion to Remand contended that the Presiding Hearing Officer failed to comply with the remand instructions issued by Judge Maloney in his decision dated May 13, 1994, when the appeal previously was decided by that Court. On April 15, 1999, Judge Hartmere granted the Commissionís Motion to Remand which essentially ordered that the case be remanded to the Commission so that it would comply with Judge Maloneyís earlier decision of May 13, 1994. Said order required a determination on the basis of the present record of when the plaintiff would have been hired as a supernumerary police officer and as a full-time "regular" police officer, and how much back pay she is entitled to receive as a result. Memorandum of Decision, May 13,1994.

Hearing Officer Heagney resigned and the undersigned Human Rights Referee was assigned on May 11, 1999 to issue a decision in full compliance with Judge Maloneyís decision dated May 13, 1994. On May 21, 1999 and July 21, 1999, the undersigned Human Rights Referee requested all parties to submit to the Office of Public Hearings specific information that was not part of the record to assist in deciding this matter on remand. Commission and Complainant responded with submissions, but unfortunately they were documents already part of the record.

III. Findings of Fact

The following are facts previously found and are limited to the issue of damages.

1.  In April 1982, the Complainant applied for a job as a police officer in the Naugatuck Police Department. The Department rejected the Complainantís application, stating that her age thirty-six (36) exceeded the Departmentís rules for new employees. Memorandum of Decision, May 13, 1994.

2.  Complainant had previously been accepted as "qualified" to apply for employment with the State Corrections Department and with the Watertown Police Department. Commission Exhibit 14.

3.  Though employment as a supernumerary police officer in the Naugatuck Police Force did not automatically translate into employment as a full-time "regular" police officer on said force, no evidence was presented of a supernumerary who wished to assume a regular police officer position in Naugatuck who thereafter failed to assume a permanent position as a full-time "regular" police officer on the Naugatuck Police Force. Transcript of June 4, 1992, p. 117.

4.  Following the refusal of the Naugatuck Police Department to accept an application from the Complainant because of their age restrictions, three individuals, William Schilke, James T. Hennessey and Ronald E. Blanchard, Jr. were hired as supernumerary police officers by Respondents on June 1, 1982. Thereafter these three individuals became full-time "regular" police officers in Naugatuck on October 3, 1982, November 7, 1982 and June 5, 1983 respectively. Commission Exhibit 6.

5.  Respondents hired five additional supernumeraries to its police department between November 7, 1983 and June 1, 1985. Commission Exhibit 6.

6.  This second group of supernumeraries became full-time "regular" police officers on various dates between July 1, 1984 and June 5, 1986. Commission Exhibit 6.

7.  The positions of supernumerary police officer were eliminated by the Respondents on June 5, 1986. All eight supernumerary police officers hired on or after June 1, 1982 were employed as full-time "regular" police officers before the supernumerary position was eliminated. Commission Exhibit 6.

8.  Rule 26 of the Rules and Regulations of the Naugatuck Police Department provided in part that "all appointments to the regular force shall be made from the supernumerary list." Commission Exhibit 10, p. 24.

9.  The average time spent by officers in the Naugatuck supernumerary police officer position was 18.5 months. Commission Exhibit 16. The average for the group of officers hired as supernumeraries at the time the Complainant applied was approximately 7 months. There is no evidence in the record, which would tend to show that the Complainant would not have been hired as a full-time "regular" police officer after the average time spent as a supernumerary. Memorandum of Decision, May 13, 1994.

10  Judge Maloney agrees with the Commission counsel that Complainant would have been hired as a full-time "regular" police officer after she served a short period less than 2 years as a supernumerary. Memorandum of Decision, May 13, 1994.

IV. Discussion

As discussed earlier, Hearing Officer Heagney found that the evidence established the Complainantís claim of age discrimination and that decision was upheld by the Superior Court Maloney, J. Memorandum of Decision, May 13,1994. Hence, the present decision only addresses three issues pertaining to damages on remand, as set forth below.

1. When Complainant would have been hired as a supernumerary police officer.

The previously found facts are: that the Complainant applied for the position of police officer with the Naugatuck Police Department in April 1982; that Complainant was qualified for the position; Memorandum of Decision, March 2, 1993; that three other individuals, William Schilke, James T. Hennessey and Ronald E. Blanchard, Jr. all applied at the same time as Complainant in April 1982; that all three aforementioned individuals completed the application process, testing and interviewing by November 1, 1983; that Complainant would have completed the application process, testing and interviewing prior to November 1, 1983; and that all three aforementioned individuals became supernumerary police officers on June 1, 1982. There is no evidence stating that Complainant would not have been hired on June 1, 1982 as a supernumerary police officer. Commissionís Memorandum, June 3, 1996. Therefore, without evidence to the contrary, it is only fair and equitable to find that this Complainant would have been hired as a supernumerary police officer along with her counterparts on June 1, 1982.

2. When Complainant would have been hired as a full-time "regular" police officer.

The previously found facts are: that the supernumerary police officers with the Naugatuck Police Department became full-time "regular" police officers after various lengths of time which averaged to be 18.5 months; Respondents Exhibit E; that the three aforementioned individuals who were hired as supernumerary police officers on June 1, 1982 became full-time "regular" police officers after various lengths of time which averaged 7 months; that one of the supernumerary police officers was hired full-time after as few as 4 months as a supernumerary, another hired after 5 months as a supernumerary and the last hired after 12 months; that there is no evidence in the record showing that the Complainant would not have been hired as a full-time "regular" police officer after the average time spent as a supernumerary police officer. Memorandum of Decision, May 13, 1994. Based on the above-findings of fact, the Complainant would have been hired full-time after the average time of the aforementioned three individuals which is 7 months.

3. How much back pay is Complainant entitled to receive as a result.

a. Back pay

Hearing Officer Heagney found that the Respondents had engaged in a discriminatory practice and therefore the Complainant should be awarded back pay. Memorandum of Decision, March 2, 1993. Respondents contend that Complainant failed to vigorously pursue her claim and therefore should not be entitled to a back pay award going back to 1982 through March 2, 1993 decision. Respondentsí Reply Brief, Oct. 7, 1992, p.23.

I disagree, there is no evidence in the record to support the claim that Complainant did not vigorously or zealously litigate her discrimination claim against the Respondents. The mere fact that the case was filed in 1982 and decided in 1993 does not provide enough basis for the Respondentsí claim that Complainant delayed the litigation of this case. See Gibbs v. Hawaiian Eugenia Corp., 966 F. 2d 101 (2nd Cir.1992). Complainant is entitled to the full amount of back pay that she would have received absent discrimination.

Judge Maloney finds that in the March 2, 1993 final decision, Hearing Officer Heagney had awarded damages for back pay, emotional distress and attorney fees. Memorandum of Decision, May 13, 1994. The amount awarded for back pay was $7,500, which is the subject of the Complainantís appeal. Id. at p.2. Hearing Officer Heagney had not found that Complainant would have been hired as a full-time "regular" police officer and accordingly his award was based on the reduced pay scale of a supernumerary officer, which would have ended employment at the end of 1985. Id. at p.3.

Federal law provides appropriate precedent for applying the provisions of the Connecticut employment discrimination statutes and the remedies available thereunder. Id. at p.4 citing State v. Commission on Human Rights and Opportunities, 211 Conn. 464, 469-470 (1989). "Furthermore, the Connecticut statute plainly commands, the commission to order affirmative retroactive relief in any case where it finds that a discriminatory practice has occurred." Id. at p.4 at 480-481. "Under federal law, the purpose of back pay is to make whole a person who suffered employment discrimination." Silhouette Optical Ltd. v. Commission on Human Rights and Opportunities, Superior Court, judicial district of Hartford-New Britain at Hartford, Docket No. CV-92-0520590 (January 27, 1994), citing Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405 (1975). "The purpose of back pay is to completely redress the economic injury the plaintiff has suffered as a result of discrimination." Id. at p.13 citing Saulpaugh v. Monroe Community Hospital, 4 F. 3d 134 (2nd Cir. 1993). "The legislative history of General Statutes ß 46a-86 is in accord with this principle." Id. at p. 13 citing 18 H.R. Proc., Pt. 2, 1975 Sess., p.921.

Respondents agree with the Complainant and Commission that the amount of the back pay awardable to Complainant if she would have been hired as a supernumerary officer for the year 1982 is $2045.39. This amount is Officer Hennesseyís income of $2,438.92 in 1982 minus Complainantís wages of $393.53 in 1982. Respondentsí Reply Brief, Oct. 7, 1992, p.23 It is undisputed that Complainantís wages from 1983 through 1991 were $148,854.98. Respondentsí Memorandum, Oct. 3, 1996. Also, Respondents recognize that the pay schedule in Complainantís Memorandum dated June 10, 1996 is accurate as it pertains to Officer Hennesseyís income, which was $270,527.37 for the years 1983 through 1991. Since, Officer Hennessey applied for the position of supernumerary police officer at the same time as Complainant, was one of the officerís hired on June 1, 1982 and ultimately became a full-time "regular" police officer, it is fair to use his income in calculating Complainantís back pay award. Respondents are not sure of the accuracy of Complainantís income, but they do not question the figures listed by Complainant and the Commission in their respective memoranda. Respondentsí Memorandum, October 3, 1996.

The record indicates a question concerning Complainantís income from 1992 through March 2, 1993. Hearing Officer Heagney requested that the parties provide him with "a complete analysis of alleged lost wages, a basis for said analysis and any and all offsets to appropriately be accounted." Scheduling Order, May 3, 1996. This information was never made part of the record. Respondents state that the figures beyond 1991, which were estimates, provided in Complainantís Memorandum dated June 10, 1996 were not presented at the Public Hearing and therefore were not subject to cross-examination nor corroborated. Respondentsí Memorandum, October 3, 1996. Even though the figures for 1992 through March 2, 1993 were not presented at the Public Hearing because, of course, they were not available at the 1992 Public Hearing, the Complainant had ample time to provide sufficient verification of income with substantiating documentation to corroborate the figures. As evidenced by what is not part of the record, this was not the case. Complainant provided estimated figures for losses incurred in 1992. Complainantís Prayer for Relief, September 2, 1992 and Complainantís Memorandum, June 10, 1996. Estimated figures are not sufficient when the Complainant has been asked at numerous times to provide income records for the years 1992 through March 2, 1993.

Complainant is entitled to back pay through the date of the award, but there is no evidence to support her claim beyond 1991. Respondentsí Memorandum, Oct. 3, 1996. Without additional information from Respondents, Complainant or Commission, which as mentioned earlier was ordered and requested by the undersigned Human Rights Referee on May 21, 1999 and July 21, 1999 as well as by the former Hearing Officer in his Scheduling Order of May 3, 1996, it is impossible to accurately assess an award for back pay from 1992 through March 2, 1993. Therefore, there will be no award for back pay for the time period, 1992 through March 2, 1993. The figures for back pay from 1982 through 1991, which were testified to at the Public Hearing and subject to cross-examination are sufficient and will be the basis for calculating the award. See Complainantís Prayer for Relief, September 2, 1992.

b. Interest

Respondents contend that Judge Maloneyís remand decision was limited in scope as to back pay and no mention was made of interest on back pay or fringe benefits and therefore this undersigned Human Rights Referee does not have the authority to award interest. Respondentsí Memorandum, Oct. 3, 1996. Under federal law, back pay awards have been interpreted to include a variety of items in order to "restore the injured worker to the economic position in which she would have been, but for the discrimination." Davis v. Jobs for Progress, Inc., 427 F. Supp. 479, 483 (D.Ariz. 1976) "The back pay award in a Title VII case should take into account interest, overtime, shift differentials, vacation and sick pay, pension benefits, bonuses and interest, as well as straight salary". Cox v. American Cast Iron Pipe Co., 784 F.2d 1546 (11th Cir. 1986) In order to be consistent with the make-whole remedial scheme of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 ß 706(g), "Title VII authorizes prejudgment interest as part of the back pay remedyÖ." Loeffler v. Frank, 486 U.S. 549 (1988); see Clarke v. Frank, 960 F.2d 1146 (2nd Cir. 1992). "The purpose of awarding prejudgment interest is to prevent an employer from attempting to enjoy an interest-free loan for as long as it can delay paying out back wages." Saulpaugh v. Monroe Community Hospital, 4 F.3d 134, 144 (2nd Cir. 1993), citing Clarke v. Frank, supra at 1154. In the case of employment discrimination, "prejudgment interestÖis an element of complete compensation." Loeffler, supra at p. 558. "It is ordinarily an abuse of discretion not to include prejudgment interest in a back pay award". Silhouette supra, citing Saulpaugh v. Monroe Community Hospital at 144.

Here, Complainantís petition for appeal stated that Hearing Officer Heagney had limited her damages by placing the burden on her to prove she would have been hired as a full-time "regular" police officer. Complainantís Petition, April 12, 1993. Judge Maloney sustained the appeal and stated that the issue on appeal was the amount awarded for back pay of $7,500. Memorandum of Decision, May 13, 1994. Judge Maloney remanded the case for further proceedings to determine the back pay award. Id. In the decision of March 2, 1993, Hearing Officer Heagney had not explained what the $7,500 back pay award consisted of. Therefore, the entire back pay award is in question which based upon the above cited cases should include interest because prejudgment interest is an appropriate element included in a back pay award. Thus, the prejudgment interest is calculated from June 1982 through 1991. As mentioned in section 3a. above, the figures provided by Complainant will be the basis for calculating the award. See Complainantís Prayer for Relief, September 2, 1992. The years 1992 through March 2, 1993 are not included for the same reasons stated in the back pay discussion in section 3a. above.

c. Fringe Benefits

Respondents also contend that fringe benefits are not under the undersigned Human Rights Refereeís authority to award because it was not ordered on remand, similar to their position on interest above. In order to make the Complainant whole, federal law has included fringe benefits under back pay. See EEOC v. Emerson Elec. Co., 39 FEP 1569 (E.D. Mo. 1986). The court found that an insurance benefits award is in the nature of back pay. Id. at 1569. "The amount of wages that could have been earned includes the value of any fringe benefits such as life insurance and medical insuranceÖ." Aledo-Garcia v. Puerto Rico Natíl Guard Fund, Inc., 887 F.2d 354, 356 (1st Cir. 1989) In one case, the plaintiff was awarded actual non-reimbursed medical expenses as part of the back pay award. Weiss v. Parker Hannifan Corp., 747 F.supp. 1118 (D.N.J. 1990).

Hearing Officer Heagney had found that Complainant would have been hired only as a supernumerary police officer and therefore, he did not order fringe benefits including non-reimbursed medical and dental costs incurred during the time Complainant would have been hired as a full-time "regular" police officer, but for the discrimination. In his remand decision, Judge Maloney ordered that back pay be redetermined pursuant to his findings. Hence, according to that decision, once back pay had been recalculated to include Complainant as a full-time "regular" police officer, she is entitled to the fringe benefits provided by Respondents, which include medical and dental costs. There is no dispute as to the figures for fringe benefits provided by Complainant and therefore those figures will be used to calculate said award. See Complainantís Prayer for Relief, September 2, 1992 and Complainant Exhibit 11.

Any other award for damages that was ordered by Hearing Officer Heagney remains undisturbed by the undersigned Human Rights Referee. See Memorandum of Decision, March 2, 1993.

V. Order for Relief on Remand

The Respondent shall pay to the Complainant the following:

a.  Monetary damages in the amount of $2,045.39 for lost back pay which is for the time period of June 1, 1982 through December 31, 1982 as a supernumerary police officer,

Calculated as follows:

Officer Hennesseyís wages minus Complainantís wages equals the lost wages for 1982.

Year: Hennessey - Complainant = Loss

1982: $2438.92 - $393.53 = $2045.39

Total Wage Loss for 1982: $2045.39

b.  Monetary damages in the amount of $121,672.39 for lost back pay for the time period of January 1, 1983 through December 31, 1991 as a full-time "regular" police officer;

Calculated as follows: Officer Hennesseyís wages minus Complainantís wages equals lost wages.

Year: Hennessey - Complainant = Loss

1983: $21020.87 - $4235.11 = $16785.76
1984: $22197.34 - $8838.00 = $13359.34
1985: $25237.39 - $12027.08 = $13210.31
1986: $27572.69 - $13673.88 = $13898.81
1987: $29809.73 - $19891.00 = $ 9918.73
1988: $31046.31 - $23143.50 = $ 7902.81
1989: $32312.39 - $20554.00 = $11758.39
1990: $40086.95 - $22227.89 = $17859.06
1991: $41243.70 - $24264.52 = $16979.18

Total Wage Loss from 1983 through 1991 = $121,672.39

c.  Monetary damages in the amount of $ 58,350.28 for prejudgment interest on back pay for the time period of June 1, 1982 through December 31, 1991;

Calculated as Follows:

Wage loss per year multiplied by ten percent divided by 365 days equals interest per day multiplied by total days of wage loss equals total interest on the lost wages and then accumulated for all pertinent years.

1.  $2,045.39 x 10% = 204.54 / 365 = $.56/day x 3533 days = $1,978.48
2.  $16,785.76 x 10% = 1,678.58 / 365 = $4.60/day x 3168 days = $14,572.80
3.  $13,359.34 x 10% = 1,335.93 / 365 = $3.66/day x 2802 days = $10,255.32
4.  $13,210.31 x 10% = 1,321.03 / 365 = $3.62/day x 2437 days = $8,821.94
5.  $13,898.81 x 10% = 1,389.88 / 365 = $3.81/day x 2072 days = $7,894.32
6.  $9,918.73 x 10% = 991.87 / 365 = $2.72/day x 1707 days = $4,643.04
7.  $7,902.81 x 10% = 790.28 / 365 = $2.17/day x 1341 days = $2,909.97
8.  $11,758.39 x 10% = 1,175.84 / 365 = $3.22/day x 976 days = $3,142.72
9.  $17,859.06 x 10% = 1,785.91 / 365 = $4.89/day x 611 days = $2,987.79
10.  $16,979.18 x 10% = 1,697.92 / 365 = $4.65/day x 246 days = $1,143.90

Total Interest on back pay through 1991 $58,350.28

d.  Monetary damages in the amount of $37,949.62 for fringe benefits for the time period of June 1, 1982 through December 31, 1991.

Calculated as Follows:

Monthly benefit amount paid multiplied by total applicable months equals total benefit for that period and then accumulated for all pertinent years.

Year: 11/82-1983  
Benefit

B/C 92.90 x 14 mos. = $1300.60
B/S 56.16 x 14 mos. = 786.24
Dental 10.27 x 14 mos. = 143.78
Life Ins. 3.60 x 14 mos = 50.40
M/M 12.02 x 14 mos. = 168.28  
                                    $2,449.30
1984 
B/C 124.85 x 12 mos. = $1498.20
B/S 65.89 x 12 mos. = 790.68
Dental* 11.50 x 12 mos. = 138.00
Life Ins. 3.60 x 12 mos. = 43.20
M/M 12.02 x 12 mos. = 144.24
                                    $2,614.32
(* approximation)
1985
B/C 159.14 x 12 mos. = $1909.68
B/S 75.62 x 12 mos. = 907.44
Dental 13.23 x 12 mos. = 158.76
Life Ins. 10.40 x 12 mos. = 124.80
M/M 25.95 x 12 mos. =  311.40
                                    $3,412.08
1986 
B/C 159.35 x 12 mos. = $1912.20
B/S 76.03 x 12 mos. = 912.36
Dental 21.27 x 12 mos. = 255.24
Life Ins. 10.40 x 12 mos = 124.80
M/M 25.95 x 12 mos. = 311.40
                                    $3,516.00
1987
B/C 178.75 x 12 mos. =$2145.00
B/S 101.06 x 12 mos. = 1212.72
Dental 27.54 x 12 mos. = 330.48
Life Ins. 10.40 x 12 mos. = 124.80
M/M 25.95 x 12 mos. = 311.40
                                $4,124.40
1988
B/C 216.87 x 12 mos. = $2602.44
B/S 99.27 x 12 mos. = 1191.24
Dental 31.75 x 12 mos. = 381.00
Life Ins. 10.40 x 12 mos. = 124.80
M/M 28.55 x 12 mos. = 342.60
                                $4,624.08
1989
B/C 260.78 x 12 mos. = $3129.36
B/S 119.96 x 12 mos. = 1439.52
Dental 32.62 x 12 mos. = 391.44
Life Ins. 10.40 x 12 mos. = 124.80
M/M 28.55 x 12 mos. = 342.60
                            $5,427.72
1990
B/C 271.60 x 12 mos. = $3259.20
B/S 124.88 x 12 mos. = 1498.56
Dental 33.96 x 12 mos. = 407.52
Life Ins. 10.40 x 12 mos. = 124.80
M/M 28.55 x 12 mos. = 342.60
                                    $5,632.68
1991
B/C 298.76 x 12 mos. = $3585.12
B/S 137.67 x 12 mos. = 1652.04
Dental 37.04 x 12 mos. = 444.48
Life Ins. 10.40 x 12 mos = 124.80
M/M 28.55 x 12 mos. = 342.60
                                    $6,149.04

Total Fringe Benefits through 1991: $37,949.62                                     

The Grand Total to be paid to Complainant is $ 220,017.68

So ordered this ____ day of August 1999, at Hartford, Connecticut
________________________
Hon. Donna Maria Wilkerson
Human Rights Referee

Endnotes:1 Roberta A. Dacey resides at 25 Sunset Drive, Naugatuck, Connecticut 06770
2 The address for Borough of Naugatuck, the Board of Burgesses, the Mayor and the Police Commission is 229 Church St., Naugatuck, Connecticut 06770
3 Pursuant to the Findings of Facts, the supernumerary positions were abolished in June 1986.





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