Commission on Human Rights : and Opportunities, ex rel. 
Angela Malizia, Complainant
v.
Thames Talent, Ltd., Respondent

June 30, 2000

MEMORANDUM OF DECISION

I. SUMMARY

This case concerns an action brought by the Commission on Human Rights and Opportunities on behalf of the complainant, Angela Malizia, against respondent, Thames Talent, Ltd., for alleged employment discrimination on the basis of the complainant’s sex. Specifically, the complainant claims that she was sexually harassed by her supervisor, the respondent’s president, and then discharged in retaliation for her complaints about the unwelcome behavior, both actions in violation of the Connecticut Fair Employment Practices Act ("FEPA"), General Statutes §§46a-51 et seq., and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended ("Title VII"), 42 U.S.C. §2000e et seq.

For the reasons stated herein, the complainant has established by a preponderance of the evidence that the respondent sexually harassed her by creating a hostile work environment and subsequently terminated her employment in retaliation for her opposition to the harassment. Relief is ordered as set forth herein.

On or about July 23, 1997, Angela Malizia ("the complainant") filed an Affidavit of Illegal Discriminatory Practice ("the complaint") with the Commission on Human Rights and Opportunities ("the commission"), alleging that Thames Talent, Ltd. ("the respondent") created a hostile working environment by sexually harassing her, and then discharged her in retaliation for opposing the harassment. (Record Exhibit ["Ex."] 1)

The commission investigated the charges of the complaint, found reasonable cause to believe that discrimination had occurred, and attempted to conciliate the matter. After conciliation failed, the complaint was certified to public hearing on September 29, 1998, in accordance with General Statutes §46a-84(a). (Record Ex. 2)

Due notice of the public hearing before the Honorable John F. Daly III was given to all parties and attorneys of record on October 16, 1998, in accordance with General Statutes §46a-84(b) and §46a-54-90 of the Regulations of Connecticut State Agencies ("the regulations"). (Record Ex. 3) The matter was reassigned to me on February 18, 1999. (Record Ex. 6)

In my July 26, 1999 ruling on the respondent’s motion to dismiss, I concluded that the respondent employed three or more people and thus was an "employer" as that term is defined in General Statutes §46a-51(10). Because the respondent employed fewer than fifteen people, it is not subject to Title VII (42 U.S.C. §2000e(b)).

A public hearing was held on February 10, 15, and 17, 2000. Thereafter, the parties filed post-hearing briefs and reply briefs, and the record closed on May 2, 2000.

All statutory and procedural prerequisites to the holding of the public hearing have been satisfied and this complaint is properly before the human rights referee for decision. (Record Exs. 1, 2, 3)

1. The respondent, a Connecticut corporation, is a management company for musical performers; its principal client is the rock band Deep Purple. At all times pertinent hereto, the respondent was, and continues to be, a Connecticut corporation. Bruce Payne is its president and Barbara Fucigna its vice-president and secretary. Payne had the power to hire, promote, demote, and discharge employees. (Ex. R-1; Transcript ["Tr."] 13 , 423; Tr. July 20, 1999, pp. 21-22;¹ see Amended Ruling on Motion to Dismiss, July 26, 1999, p. 2)

2. The respondent hired the complainant in October 1993 as a secretary and/or bookkeeper. The complainant worked predominantly for Fucigna for a little more than two years, and then, when Payne was unable to replace his departed assistant, she worked briefly for both Payne and Fucigna. In December 1995, the complainant began to work solely for Payne when Andrea Pisanelli, the complainant’s cousin, was hired to work as a secretary for Fucigna. (Tr. 10-12; Tr. July 20, 1999, p. 86)

3. The complainant’s job duties when working for Payne consisted primarily of handling office correspondence, handling fan mail for the musicians, assisting with album artwork, and typing lyric sheets. (Tr. 12)

4. Fucigna was pleased with the work the complainant did for her. (Tr. 412; see also Amended Ruling on Motion to Dismiss, p. 6)² When the complainant began working directly for Payne, he too was pleased with her work performance and viewed her as "very good at what she did . . ." (Tr. 13; Tr. July 20, 1999, p. 85)

5. The complainant had a pleasant and comfortable professional relationship with Payne while she was working for Fucigna. (Tr.16, 315-16, 440) Within a few months after beginning to work solely for Payne, their relationship began to be strained and the complainant became uncomfortable around Payne due to a series of incidents involving certain of his comments and actions. (Tr. 16-19)

6. Although most of these incidents occurred from July 1996 through January 1997, several occurred much earlier. (Tr. 103) For example, from the beginning of the complainant’s employment in 1993, Payne frequently told the complainant that she was "cute," often in front of other individuals. He also told others, in front of the complainant, that she was cute. (Tr. 30-31, 322, 453)

7. In December 1995, when Payne was on a trip to London, he called the office, indicated that he was buying gifts for the women in the office, and asked the complainant what size underwear she wore. She did not tell him her size, but nevertheless Payne brought back underwear for the complainant and Fucigna. The incident bothered her, but at that time she did not expect to encounter further uncomfortable situations. (Tr. 33, 104, 106-09)

8. In the summer of 1996, Payne was planning a pool party at his home. Several times he joked with the complainant that she should come in her bikini or else he would not have the party. Although the complainant knew that Payne was joking about canceling his party, his repeated requests made her uncomfortable. (Tr. 23, 44, 137-39)

9. Payne frequently commented on the complainant’s clothing. In the warm weather, he occasionally called the office before he came in to see if the complainant was wearing shorts. Sometimes he said that he would not come in to the office unless she was wearing shorts. She knew that he was joking around but, nevertheless, the comments made her uncomfortable. (Tr. 24, 45, 140-42) Sometimes Payne called the complainant into his office and asked her to show off what she was wearing. The complainant declined and felt embarrassed. (Tr. 142-43) Payne also complimented Fucigna and Pisanelli on their attire (Tr. 291

10. Payne occasionally told the complainant that she had "great legs" and told her he liked seeing her in shorts. (Tr. 24, 266, 360-61) One time, he showed the complainant a picture of a bikini-clad woman, and encouraged her to wear that kind of bathing suit. (Tr. 42)

11. Payne occasionally complimented Fucigna on her legs, and Fucigna was not offended by his comment. (Tr. 361)

12. One time in 1996, while the complainant was standing at the office postage meter, Payne lifted her back shirt tail. When the complainant asked Payne what he was doing, he replied that he was looking at the tag on her jeans. The complainant was embarrassed by this, especially because it happened in front of Pisanelli. (Tr. 25, 267)

13. Another time in 1996, while the complainant was working at her computer, Payne pulled back the complainant’s shirt collar and peered down her back. (Tr. 25, 198, 287)

14. On about five occasions, Payne called the complainant (and sometimes Pisanelli) into his office to see photos of nude women he had downloaded from the internet. The complainant believed this to be typical of Payne’s sense of humor, but she nevertheless was bothered by this and usually walked out without saying anything. (Tr. 25-26, 155-60, 268-69)

15. At some point after a Deep Purple tour in 1996, Payne told the complainant that the band members had "voted" that she had the "best ass." (Tr. 25, 267-68)³ Although she laughed uncomfortably, she felt particularly demeaned because she wanted to be taken seriously in her job and not discussed this way behind her back. (Tr. 149, 154-55, 288)

16. During that same tour, Payne and Steve Morse, a member of Deep Purple, had discussed the complainant, and Payne let Morse know that he could ask the complainant for a date. Payne thereafter told this to the complainant. Payne also arranged for the two to be together in a hotel hospitality suite during one of the band’s tours, and then Morse asked the complainant to go out for something to eat. The complainant declined and was offended that Payne would set up such a situation. (Tr. 27-28, 160-63)

17. At some point in 1996, Payne demonstrated the use of a laser pen by pointing the red light beam directly at the complainant’s breasts. The complainant felt embarrassed and very upset by this; she made a face or gesture demonstrating her disgust. (Tr. 29, 47, 165, 169)

18. In late 1996 or early 1997, Payne asked the complainant to try on a ski jacket he had purchased for Fucigna’s eight year old son. He made comments about how the jacket would not fit her in the front as easily as it would fit the boy. He jokingly encouraged her to remove her shirt to try on what was either the fleece liner from the ski jacket or another jacket. In response, the complainant laughed nervously. The complainant did try on the ski jacket, but did not remove her blouse to try on the second garment. (Tr. 31-32, 175-79, 269-70)

19. A store that featured gaudy, provocative lingerie in its display window was located downstairs from the respondent’s second floor office. The office staff would sometimes comment or joke about the items they saw. Several times, when talking about the store, Payne offered to buy underwear for the complainant if she would tell him her size. The complainant was bothered by this question and refused to give Payne this information. (Tr. 32, 179-84, 324)

20. When the complainant wore bell-bottom pants to work, Payne told her she looked better in bell-bottoms and had a "nicer ass" than his fiancée, Janet Gardner. (Tr. 34)

21. On one occasion in 1996, when the complainant commented about her back pain, Payne asked her if it was the result of "wild sex in a motel room." (Tr. 33-34) Again, the complainant realized that the comment was in jest but, nevertheless, she felt annoyed and intimidated. (Tr. 188-89)

22. One time prior to December 1995, Payne asked the complainant if her boyfriend was circumcised. The complainant avoided the question by saying she did not know. Another time, after the complainant began working for Payne, he asked her if she stayed with her boyfriend because of good sex. The complainant was bothered by these comments and felt that her sex life was none of Payne’s business; she did not say this to him, however. (Tr. 34-35, 193-95)

23. Payne offered to take the complainant on a business trip to Bermuda, without Gardner. The complainant declined. The complainant instead had hoped Payne would take her on his business trip to Germany. Payne commented that if they shared a hotel room, he might be able to afford it. (Tr. 36-37)

24. On one or two occasions, Payne asked the complainant to come to his house for cooking lessons when Gardner was not at home. (Tr. 174-75)

25. The complainant occasionally played golf with Payne after work, although she stopped playing as her discomfort increased. (Tr. 127-29)

26. The office was small, 600 to 800 square feet, with enclosed offices for Payne and Fucigna and an adjacent open area for the two support staff, whose desks were, at most, fifteen feet apart. Because of its size, employees could sometimes overhear each others’ conversations. (Tr. 97-98, 281, 314, 348, 426)

27. The office environment was a friendly and casual one and the complainant generally got along with everyone. The respondent’s employees often discussed their personal lives, used coarse language, and talked and joked about sexual matters. (Tr. 93, 118, 281, 310-12, 346) When initially interviewing the complainant, Fucigna described the office atmosphere to her to ensure that she would be comfortable in such a setting. (Tr. 93, 340-41)

28. Sometimes the complainant would speak to Fucigna and Payne about her difficult relationship with her boyfriend, but she did not discuss the sexual aspects of the relationship. (Tr. 58, 118-22, 325, 349-51, 508; see also Tr. 276, where Pisanelli testified that the complainant was not the type of person who would discuss her sex life.)

29. While the complainant was still working for Fucigna, a woman named Betty Hance worked for Payne for about five months. Hance frequently and openly discussed personal matters, including matters of a sexual nature, with others in the office. She readily contributed to the casual and sometimes bawdy atmosphere of the office.⁴ (Tr. 115, 131-32, 306, 311-12)

30. The complainant did not initially complain about Payne’s actions and comments because she hoped they were isolated incidents. In any event, Payne sometimes worked at home or would be out of the office for long periods of time when Deep Purple was touring. The complainant felt "safe and secure" when he was away. Later, she became increasingly uncomfortable and preoccupied with Payne’s behavior; however, she still refrained from complaining because she was worried about Payne’s reaction. Eventually realizing that Payne’s behavior was not going to change, she became quieter and withdrawn and her relationship with Payne became even more strained.⁵ (Tr. 40, 43-44, 143, 274, 294, 352-53, 475)

31. At some point, the complainant began to wear baggy sweaters and large clothing that would cover up her body, in order to discourage Payne’s comments about her appearance and her body. (Tr. 45-48, 273)

32. The complainant took her work seriously and was hoping to build a career in the music industry. She felt that Payne’s behavior denied her the respect she was trying to earn. (Tr. 48-49)

34. The complainant’s increasing discomfort took a toll on her attitude and demeanor. This, in turn, affected her work and pervaded the office atmosphere. Although Fucigna observed these changes, she did not speak to the complainant about them. She did, however, discuss the complainant’s attitude and performance with Payne and Pisanelli. (Tr. 40, 43, 48, 352-58, 380, 479)

35. Payne sensed the tension as well and on a few occasions told the complainant that it seemed as if she didn’t like him. (Tr. 50) He also was concerned about her "attitude" in the office, referring to her growing discontent. He discussed the complainant’s performance and attitude with Pisanelli, who, in turn, shared some of his concerns with the complainant. Pisanelli did not tell the complainant that Payne was contemplating terminating her. (Tr. 224-27, 292, 475)

37. On or about January 22, 1997, Payne and Pisanelli were standing in front of the complainant’s desk, looking at a photograph album of former employees. When looking at a picture of someone named DeeDee [or Denise], Payne said, so that complainant could hear, that DeeDee had large breasts but they were "not as nice and firm as Angela’s" or "not as full and firm as Angela’s." The complainant was extremely bothered and embarrassed by this comment and, in fact, had reached a point where she felt that she could no longer remain silent in the face of Payne’s behavior. She asked Payne to refrain from commenting about her breasts because it made her uncomfortable. (Tr. 39-41, 144, 209-12, 272)

38. On or about January 29, 1997, the complainant met with Payne to discuss her work performance. Payne told her that he was satisfied with her work and suggested that she might soon get a raise if her recent performance continued.

39. On Friday, January 31, 1997, the complainant met with Payne and Fucigna to discuss, among other things, the ongoing tension in the office. The complainant reiterated that she was offended and bothered by Payne’s behavior and comments, and that they were affecting her attitude at work.⁶ (Tr. 51-53) Payne was annoyed that the complainant raised this issue again. He testified—without credibility—that he perceived the complainant’s comments as a threat of reprisal if he did not accede to her request for a raise. (Tr. 482, 492-93)

40. The complainant and Payne met again on Monday, February 3, 1997. At that time, Payne terminated the complainant’s employment, and told her that she was being terminated because they could not work together. (Tr. 54, 484)⁷

41. When the complainant was hired in October 1993 her annual salary was $27,500. (Tr. 10) In October 1994, Fucigna told the complainant that she was pleased with her work and the respondent increased her annual salary to $30,500. (Tr. 11) In February 1996, after the complainant had been working for Payne for two months, her salary was increased to $32,500 annually. This final raise was for her previous year’s work for Fucigna, not for the few months working for Payne. (Tr. 13-14, 218, 381-82) Payne did not give raises on an annual basis, but awarded them when he felt it appropriate. (Tr. 50)

42. The complainant received Christmas bonuses each year. In 1993, she received either $200 or $250; in 1994, she received $750; in 1995, $1000, and in 1996, $1,250. (Tr. 14-15)

43. The respondent gave the complainant $1,240 in severance pay. (Ex. R-15)⁸ Fucigna wrote a general letter of reference for the complainant, but the complainant was afraid to ask Payne for one. (Tr. 219)

44. For about three months after her termination, the complainant was so depressed that she made no effort to look for a new job. She stayed at home, did a small amount of volunteer work for a friend, and took a one-week vacation with her parents. Thereafter, she took a seminar on job-seeking and sent some inquiries and made telephone calls to potential employers, mostly in Stamford and New York City areas. At first she focused on companies in the music industry, but she failed even to get an interview. (Ex. C-10; Tr. 62-64, 74, 221-22, 229, 233, 252)

45. After the complainant’s discharge, she collected $7,916 in unemployment compensation for a period of about twenty-four weeks. (Ex. C-2) She paid COBRA premiums for medical insurance for a period of six months at $300-400⁹ per month for a total of $2,070. (Tr. 69)

46. In late July or August, 1997, the complainant enrolled with Career Blazers, a temporary job placement agency that placed her in various positions. She generally worked three to five eight-hour days per week, earning thirteen to sixteen dollars per hour. She received no benefits. (Tr. 64-66, 70)

47. A temporary job with a company called LRI led to a permanent position in August 1997. The complainant continued to work at LRI through March 1998. The complainant earned thirteen dollars per hour when she began as a temporary employee, and was earning eighteen dollars per hour at the time she left. The complainant received no benefits from LRI and had to pay $170 per month for medical insurance.¹⁰ Because LRI was a struggling new company, it ultimately determined that it could not keep the complainant full time. (Tr. 66-68, 71)

48. In April 1998, the complainant took a position at Caliber Solutions ("Caliber"), a small computer software consulting firm in her home town of Stamford. The people who own the company are family friends and the complainant feels comfortable working for them. She works an average of thirty-five hours per week and has earned nineteen dollars per hour since she began. She receives no paid vacation, holidays, sick leave, or medical insurance. For an undetermined amount of time, the complainant was not insured at all, because of the cost. At some point in time, not specified in the record, she began to pay between $300-400 every four months for medical insurance.¹¹ Caliber has indicated that it would pay for her to return to college at night to finish her undergraduate degree. (Tr. 71-73, 234-38)

49. Although she enjoys her job at Caliber, the complainant has made a few attempts to find a better paying job, one with regular benefits, and has placed her resume with Career Blazers and with "head hunters." She has looked in the newspaper and on the internet and has made some inquiries, but she has had no interviews. She has generally limited her queries to the greater Stamford area. (Tr. 83, 236-42) The complainant acknowledges that it is "not easy to look for a job while you’re working . . ." (Tr. 240)

50. In 1997, the complainant earned $3,101 working for the respondent in the month of January and $9,934 in wages for the last five months of the year, for a total of $13,035.13. (Exs. C-2, C-2(a))

51. In 1998, the complainant’s income comprised $22,328 in wages and $1,357 in unidentified "other income," for a total of $23,685. (Ex. C-3) Nothing in the record identifies the nature or source of the latter, and nothing indicates whether the complainant would have received this sum had she remained employed by the respondent.¹²

52. In 1999, the complainant earned $27,920 in wages while working for Caliber. (Ex. C-4)

IV. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS

Discrimination in employment based on gender is prohibited by General Statutes §46a-60(a)(8), which provides, in pertinent part, that

[i]t shall be a discriminatory practice in violation of this section: For an employer, by himself or his agent...to harass any employee...on the basis of sex. ‘Sexual harassment’ shall, for purposes of this section, be defined as any unwelcome sexual advances or requests for sexual favors or any conduct of a sexual nature when...(C) such conduct has the purpose of or effect of substantially interfering with an individual’s work performance or creating an intimidating, hostile or offensive working environment.

As the Connecticut Supreme Court has stated, "[i]n defining the contours of an employer’s duties under our state antidiscrimination statutes, we have looked for guidance to federal case law interpreting Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, the federal statutory counterpart to §46a-60." Brittell v. Department of Correction, 247 Conn. 148, 164 (1998).

For sexual harassment to be actionable, the complainant must prove that her workplace was permeated with discriminatory intimidation, ridicule or insult that was sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the conditions of her employment and¹³ create an abusive working environment. Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Services, Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 78 (1998); Harris v. Forklift Systems, Inc. 510 U.S. 17, 21 (1993); Brittell v. Department of Correction, supra, 247 Conn. 166-67.

The complainant must demonstrate that the work environment was objectively offensive (that is, one that a reasonable person would find hostile or abusive) and that she subjectively perceived the work environment to be hostile or abusive. I must look at the totality of circumstances to determine whether the work environment was hostile or abusive, including the frequency of the offending conduct, its severity, whether it was threatening or humiliating (rather than a mere offensive utterance), and whether it interfered with an employee’s work performance. Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 786 (1998); Harris v. Forklift Systems, supra, 510 U.S. 21-22; Quinn v. Green Tree Credit Corp., 159 F.3d 759, 767-68 (2^nd Cir. 1998); Brittell v. Department of Correction, supra, 247 Conn. 167.

To succeed in her claim, the complainant must also demonstrate that the offensive incidents were repeated and continuous; episodic, isolated acts, unless particularly egregious, will not necessarily merit relief. Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, supra, 524 U.S. 788 ; Kotcher v. Rosa and Sullivan Appliance Center, Inc. 957 F.2d 59, 62 (2^nd Cir. 1992). "Isolated remarks or occasional episodes of harassment will not merit relief under Title VII; in order to be actionable, the incidents of harassment must occur in concert or with a regularity that can reasonably be termed pervasive." Tomka v. Seiler Corp., 66 F.3d 1295, 1305 n.5 (2^nd Cir. 1995)

Payne’s offensive behavior did not consist of isolated incidents. Thematically uniform in its focus on the complainant’s appearance, sexuality, and physical attributes, his conduct persisted on a regular basis from the end of 1995 until late January 1997. The complainant enjoyed a respite only when Payne was out of the office, whether working at home or touring with Deep Purple. Even then, he was able to—and did—reach her by telephone to discuss her appearance. Although many of the incidents, by themselves, are not so severe as to constitute harassment, collectively they are of sufficient severity and regularity to be considered pervasive. See Quinn v. Green Tree, supra, 159 F.3d 768. As the complainant aptly stated in her reply brief (p. 6), "[n]o woman should have to go to a workplace where her breasts and body are an acceptable topic of conversation."

The complainant knew the general nature of the workplace when she accepted the job in 1993. She believed that it would not affect her and, in fact, from the beginning of her employment until she began to work solely for Payne, she had only an inkling of what she would be facing. Unquestionably, matters changed when she began to report directly to Payne at the end of 1995.

The respondent suggests that the complainant, having been forewarned about the office atmosphere, nevertheless chose to accept employment and thus implicitly waived her objections. See Gross v. Burggraf Construction Co., 53 F.3d 1531, 1538 (10^th Cir. 1995), where the court noted that the standard for determining sexual harassment should vary according to the work environment. The better view, and the one I follow here, is expressed in a recent decision from the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals:

[W]e reject the view that the standard for sexual harassment varies depending on the work environment. Thus, we disagree with the Tenth Circuit decision in Gross v. Burggraf [citation omitted], in which the court reasoned "[W]e must evaluate Gross’ claim of gender discrimination in the context of a[n] . . . environment where crude language is commonly used by male and female employees. Speech that might be offensive or unacceptable in a prep school faculty meeting, or on the floor of Congress, is tolerated in other work environments." We do not believe that a woman who chooses to work in the male-dominated trades relinquishes her right to be free from sexual harassment indeed, we find this reasoning to be illogical, because it means that the more hostile the environment, and the prevalent the sexism, the more difficult it is for a Title VII plaintiff to prove that sex-based conduct is sufficiently severe or pervasive to constitute a hostile work environment. Surely, women working in the trades do not deserve less protection from the law than women working in the courthouse.

Williams v. General Motors Corp., 187 F.3d 553, 564 (6^th Cir. 1999). While the facts and the nature of the employer differ somewhat from the case before me, the persuasive logic is the same: "judgments by the court as to a woman’s assumption of risk upon entering a hostile environment are improper." Id.; see also U.S. EEOC Technical Assistance Program, Sex Discrimination (rev. February 2000) §C, pp. 17-18 ("In general, a woman does not forfeit her right to be free from sexual harassment by choosing to work in an atmosphere that has traditionally included vulgar, anti-female language.").

The complainant did not readily or willingly contribute to this aspect of the work environment but, wanting to fit in with the others, she took a "grin and bear it" approach, a tack that ultimately proved unsuccessful. Even if the complainant did contribute to the sexually charged atmosphere of the workplace, as Hance suggested, her claim would not automatically be defeated. See Swenteck v. USAir, Inc., 830 F.2d 552, 557 (4^th Cir. 1987). Participating in discussions about exotic underwear or even about personal intimacies is not an open invitation for suggestive comments or unwanted touching. Similarly, acquiescence to compliments and sexual innuendo does not necessarily make the respondent’s conduct appropriate or welcome. Nor does it matter that others in the office enjoyed the sexual banter and suggestive humor permeating the office. The complainant found Payne’s conduct offensive to her, and there is no requirement that her sensibilities and sensitivities mirror those of others in the workplace.

Aside from Payne’s compliments about Fucigna’s legs, it is fairly obvious that Payne’s attention was predominantly focused on the complainant’s body, in particular her breasts, her legs, and her buttocks. Although Fucigna may have been flattered by the attention Payne jokingly gave to her (i.e., Fucigna’s) figure, the complainant was not; she perceived it as demeaning and unprofessional. Fucigna, in fact, was in a far different position than the complainant. She had worked professionally with Payne for over twenty years, she had in the past been romantically involved with him for several years, and, most important, she and Payne were both officers of the respondent and worked together almost like partners. Comments about her body thus did not demean or intimidate her, but it is unfair to compare her to the complainant.

The complainant testified credibly that Payne’s conduct was humiliating and intimidating. She felt demeaned and worried that the respondent’s clients would view her not as a professional but as a sex object. She felt powerless in the small office, unable to assert her concerns to Payne for fear of reprisal—not unusual, given his authority as president and her vulnerability as a young employee.

The complainant’s failure to complain to Payne or, for that matter, to Fucigna does not defeat her claim. Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 72 (1986); Blikre v. Commission on Human Rights and Opportunities, supra, 1995 WL 669157 *6. The very nature of harassment and the fear of reprisals from a person in power often will deter the victim from speaking up. As stated in the U.S. EEOC Technical Assistance Program, Sex Discrimination (rev. February 2000) §F, p. 18n. 59: "Surveys have shown that a common reason for a failure to report harassment to management is fear of retaliation. . . . Surveys also have shown that a significant proportion of harassment victims are worse off after complaining. . . ."(Citations omitted.)

The complainant was able to discern that some of Payne’s comments and actions were meant as jokes, but nevertheless his humor and his comments made her increasingly uncomfortable. As the complainant sardonically testified when asked on cross-examination if she thought Payne was joking about the source of her back troubles (i.e., wild motel sex), "It’s all jokes, I guess." The irony here, as the complainant well recognizes, is that to her the joking was long past the stage of being funny, long past eliciting any response other than nervous laughter, embarrassment, discomfort, and humiliation.

Pisanelli corroborated the complainant’s testimony regarding the incidents she observed, and also recounted conversations she had with the complainant after other incidents; she felt embarrassed for the complainant and sympathized with her discomfort.¹⁴

The record leaves no doubt that Payne’s conduct unreasonably interfered with the complainant’s work performance. It is not in the least surprising that an employee may become so upset by and preoccupied with the harassment that she can no longer maintain a positive attitude at work and can no longer perform her job duties as effectively as before. Nor is it unusual that others in the workplace would sense and respond to the tension, especially in an office as small as the respondent’s. This is precisely what occurred here.

For a while the complainant kept hoping the incidents would cease and she kept her concerns to herself, but she came to realize that nothing would change. Yet she did not speak up, in fear of angering Payne, further disrupting their already-stressed relationship and possibly jeopardizing her job. As the complainant testified,

I just felt like I think originally when things would happen I would feel like it won’t happen again or he’ll see that it bothers me if I don’t respond to it and I change the subject, you know, it will go away because you don’t think that somebody’s going to keep doing that. You don’t want to say anything because you don’t want to lose your job, you don’t want to have conflict . . .

(Tr. 40). A shy, young woman who liked the nature of her work and who hoped to develop in the music business logically would fear alienating her boss. It is no wonder that the complainant remained silent, and it is no surprise that repressing her feelings took its toll on her work and her attitude.

Many of Payne’s comments and actions appeared to go unobserved by Fucigna and, to some extent, by Pisanelli. According to the respondent, given the size of the office, their lack of awareness casts doubt on the veracity of the complainant’s allegations. Again, I disagree with the respondent. Fucigna could not observe what occurred in Payne’s office or out of her line of vision in the open area; Pisanelli had only limited view into Payne’s office. The complainant’s failure to obtain corroboration from others in the office does not undermine her action. In Blikre v. Commission on Human Rights and Opportunities, 1995 WL 669157 *7 (Conn. Super.), the Superior Court rejected the notion that employees working in close quarters would automatically be aware of everything going on around them.

The complainant has proven that Payne created a work environment that was both objectively and subjectively hostile, and one which adversely affected her work performance. Having demonstrated that she was subject to a hostile work environment, the complainant must also demonstrate that Payne’s actions should be attributed to the respondent. Cosgrove v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 9 F.3d 1033, 1042 (2^nd Cir. 1993).

In 1998, the U.S. Supreme Court determined that employers are subject to vicarious liability for unlawful sexual harassment by an employee’s supervisor. There is no dispute that Payne was the complainant’s supervisor from the end of 1995 until he discharged her at the beginning of February, 1997. According to the Supreme Court, an employer will always be liable for a supervisor’s harassment if it culminates in a tangible employment action. If the supervisor’s behavior does not lead to a tangible action, however, the employer may avoid liability or limit damages by proving a two-part affirmative defense. Burlington Industries, Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S.742, 765 (1998); Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, supra, 524 U.S. 807; see also Brittell v. Department of Correction, supra 247 Conn. 166 n. 30. In the present case, Payne’s harassment culminated in a tangible employment action—the complainant’s discharge—and thus the respondent is strictly liable and cannot raise the affirmative defense. See, e.g., Newtown v. Shell Oil Company, 52 F. Supp.2d 366, 373 (D.Conn. 1999) ("because plaintiff suffered an adverse employment action, i.e., the termination of her employment following her complaints about [her supervisor’s] conduct, . . . [the defendant] may not present [the] affirmative defense . . .").

An employer will also be automatically liable when the situation involves a small employer and a harassing supervisor who is deemed the "alter ego" or "proxy"of the employer. Such is the case before me. As the court recognized in Faragher, an employer is liable for unlawful harassment when the harasser is of sufficiently high rank as to fall "within that class . . . who may be treated as the organization’s proxy." Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, supra, 524 U.S. 789. Typically, a company president, a partner, or a proprietor is the type of official whose actions will automatically be attributed to the employer. Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, supra, 524 U.S. 789-90, citing Katz v. Dole, 709 F.2d 251, 256 (4^th Cir. 1983). Payne, the complainant’s supervisor, is the respondent’s president and director, he reports to no higher individual, and he has the authority to direct the complainant’s daily work activities and to undertake tangible employment decisions affecting her. His actions, therefore, must be imputed to the respondent, which, even absent tangible consequences, is not entitled to raise the affirmative defense. Id.; Randall v. Tod-Nik Audiology, Inc., 704 N.Y.S. 2d 228, 229 (2000); see Torres v. Pisano, 116 F.3d 625, 634-35 and n.11 (2^nd Cir. 1997).

In light of the foregoing, I conclude that the respondent is liable for sexually harassing the complainant.

The complainant also alleges that the respondent terminated her in retaliation for her opposition to his harassment. According to General Statutes §46a-60(a)(4), it "shall be a discriminatory practice in violation of this section for any . . . employer . . . to discharge, expel or otherwise discriminate against any person because [she] has opposed any discriminatory employment practice . . . ."

Analysis of a retaliation claim follows the three-step burden-shifting paradigm established in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802-04 (1973) and its progeny. Quinn v. Green Tree, supra,159 F.3d 768-69; Tomka v. Seiler Corp., supra, 66 F.3d 1308; Langner v. The Stop & Shop Companies, Inc., 2000 WL 739612 *2 (Conn. Super.). The complainant bears the initial burden of proving a prima facie case, which gives rise to a presumption of discriminatory retaliation. The complainant’s burden is not an onerous one. Ann Howard’s Apricots Restaurant, Inc. v. Commission on Human Rights and Opportunities, 237 Conn. 209, 225 (1991). Once the complainant establishes her prima facie case, the burden of production shifts to the respondent to articulate, but not prove, a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for the adverse action. Should the respondent carry this burden, the burden then shifts back to the complainant to prove that the articulated reason was a pretext for impermissible retaliation. Quinn v. Green Tree, supra, 159 F.3d 768-69; Gallagher v. Delaney, 139 F.3d 338, 349 (2^nd Cir. 1999). The complainant retains at all times the ultimate burden of persuasion on the critical issue—whether the respondent intentionally retaliated against the complainant for engaging in a protected activity. Cosgrove v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 9 F.3d 1033, 1039 (2^nd Cir. 1993).

To establish a prima facie case of retaliation, the complainant must show that (1) she engaged in statutorily protected activity; (2) the respondent was aware of the complainant’s activity; (3) the complainant suffered an adverse employment action; and (4) there existed a causal link between the complainant’s activity and the adverse action. Quinn v. Green Tree, supra, 159 F.3d 769 (note: first two prongs combined into one); Distasio v. Perkin Elmer Corporation, 157 F.3d 55, 66 (2^nd Cir. 1998); Newtown v. Shell Oil Company, supra, 52 F.Supp.2d 373.

Recent cases, including those in the Second Circuit, have held that an activity is protected if the employee had a reasonable, good faith belief that the practice opposed constituted unlawful harassment, even when the conduct would not actually qualify as harassment under applicable law. Quinn v. Green Tree, supra, 159 F.3d 769; Sumner v. United States Postal Service, 899 F.2d 202 (2^nd Cir 1990); Commission on Human Rights and Opportunities ex rel. Shea v. Spruance, CHRO No.9640243 (October 26, 1999)(FitzGerald, Human Rights Referee). Thus, even if I had found against the complainant on her harassment claim, she could still proceed on her retaliation claim because the record unequivocally shows that she had a good faith belief that Payne’s actions and comments constituted sexual harassment.

The complainant has readily established the first three elements of her prima facie case. First, she complained to the respondent on January 22 and January 31, 1997 about activities which constituted (or which she reasonably and in good faith believed constituted) sexual harassment. Kotcher v. Rosa & Sullivan Appliance Ctr., Inc. 957 F.2d 59, 64-65 (2^nd Cir. 1992)(pursuit of internal remedies may constitute a protected activity). Second, her complaints were made directly to Payne, who is her supervisor and the respondent’s president. Third, her discharge constituted an adverse employment action. Termination of employment is considered to be actionable retaliatory treatment. See, e.g., Quinn v. Green Tree, supra, 159 F.3d 769; Newtown v. Shell Oil Company, supra, 52 F. Supp.2d 374; Commission ex rel. Shea v. Spruance, CHRO No. 9640243, supra, 14.

The fourth element, the causal connection between the protected activity and the termination, is the critical one. According to the Connecticut District Court, "[c]ourts have noted that temporal proximity can give rise to a reasonable inference of a causal connection between the protected activity and the adverse employment action." Newtown v. Shell Oil Company, supra, 52 F.Supp.2d 374. See also Reed v. A.W. Lawrence & Co., Inc. 95 F.3d 1170, 1178 (2^nd Cir. 1996)(causal connection shown by, among other things, evidence of twelve-day span between initial complaint and discharge); Tomka v. Seiler Corp., 66 F.3d 1295, 1308 (2^nd Cir. 1995)(plaintiff terminated a few weeks after mentioning that she was considering legal action); Quinn v. Green Tree, supra 159 F.3d 769 (causal connection established when plaintiff discharged less than two months after filing an internal complaint and ten days after filing complaint with state department of human rights), citing Manoharan v. Columbia Univ. College of Physicians & Surgeons, 842 F.2d 590, 593 (2^nd Cir. 1988)("[p]roof of the causal connection can be established indirectly by showing that the protected activity was closely followed in time by the adverse action"); Ponticelli v. Zurich American Insurance Group, 16 F.Supp. 2d 414, 435 (S.D.N.Y. 1998) (quoting Manoharan).

The complainant was discharged twelve days after she first objected to Payne’s comments, and one business day after she reiterated her concerns to him. I find that the complainant has established her prima facie case, thus shifting the burden to the respondent to proffer a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for discharging the complainant.

The respondent, in turn, has met its burden by providing testimony that the complainant was discharged because of her unsatisfactory work performance, her bad attitude, and a personality conflict. The burden must, therefore, shift back to the complainant to prove that the respondent’s stated reason was pretext for impermissible retaliation.

The respondent’s contention is supported almost entirely by self-serving testimony from its president and from its vice-president, who has had a personal and professional relationship with the president for more than twenty years. Since at least the middle of 1996, they were concerned about the complainant’s attitude. Pisanelli corroborated their testimony when she acknowledged that the complainant’s attitude changes had been the topic of conversation among the three of them. Pisanelli had even spoken with the complainant about Payne’s concerns. Thus, the respondent’s justifications have at least some basis in fact and were not merely fabricated for the purposes of defending this action.

Nevertheless, the respondent offered no written documentation of any performance problems, whether shared with the complainant or merely kept in a personnel file; indeed, on this record, there was none. Nor did the respondent identify any specific deficiencies in the complainant’s performance, other than her telephone manners. No client or other third party described any problems they encountered in their dealings with the complainant. The main problem appeared to be the complainant’s attitude, her growing estrangement from Payne and, to a lesser extent, from Fucigna. Payne’s occasional discussions with the complainant in 1996 focused less on her professional shortcomings than on her negative attitude—an attitude fostered by Payne’s own conduct. Even then, prior to the complainant’s assertiveness on January 22, 1997, Payne had never so much as intimated that her attitude or performance was so problematic as to jeopardize her employment. In fact, when he finally discharged her, he attributed the problem to a "personality conflict," not to her work performance.

The complainant, on the other hand, provided strong reason to discount the respondent’s proffered explanation. She had an unblemished track record from the time she began to work for the respondent until the middle of 1996. The uncontroverted testimony shows that when the complainant worked for Fucigna, there were no problems with her performance or her attitude and she received annual raises. For the brief time she worked for both Payne and Fucigna, there also were no problems and she was getting Payne’s work done without difficulty. Similarly, in the first few months she reported solely to Payne, he was pleased with her work.

I find that the respondent’s explanation is unworthy of credence. While there is sufficient evidence of the complainant’s attitude problem at least half a year before her termination, the overwhelming evidence demonstrates that the respondent’s decision was motivated not by the complainant’s attitude or alleged professional shortcomings, but by her complaint about Payne’s harassing behavior.

The evidence in this record provides further proof that the complainant was not discharged for legitimate reasons. In their joint reply brief, the complainant and the commission hone in on the critical issue, correctly and pointedly undercutting the respondent’s proffered justification:

In addition, Respondent’s repeated assertions that Complainant had a poor attitude do not detract from this conclusion [that the respondent was motivated by retaliation]. . . . Respondent attempts to turn Complainant’s claim on its head by claiming that her ‘attitude problem,’ which was caused by her fear and apprehension of Mr. Payne, was the real reason for terminating her employment. Such an argument allows an employer to take advantage of his or her own offensive conduct.

Joint reply brief, p. 9. Various courts have held that an employee’s diminished performance cannot be asserted as a legitimate basis for her discharge, when that diminution is the direct result of the employer’s discriminatory behavior. Avery v. Delchamps, 1994 WL 637738 *3 (E.D. La. 1994); Jensvold v. Shalala, 829 F.Supp. 131, 136 (D. Md. 1993); Delgado v. Lehman, 665 F.Supp. 460, 467 (E.D. Va. 1987); Moffett v. Gene B. Glick Co., Inc., 621 F.Supp. 244, 281 (N.D. Ind. 1985); Weiss v. United States, 595 F.Supp. 1050, 1057 (E.D. Va. 1984); Sumner v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 427 Mich. 505, 545 n.17 (1986).

This principle squarely applies to the matter before me. The record amply demonstrates that Payne’s persistent, innuendo-laden comments and jokes, unwanted touches, and pervasive focus on her body created a hostile work environment which affected the complainant’s attitude and, in turn, her work performance. Thus, the respondent’s reasons for terminating the complainant are not justifiable precisely because they are the result of Payne’s actions, not the complainant’s alleged deficiencies. Moffett v. Gene B. Glick Co., supra, 621 F.Supp. 281.

The complainant has convincingly met her burden of proving that her discharge was motivated by retaliation, in violation of General Statutes §46(a)-60(a)(4).

When the presiding human rights referee determines that unlawful discrimination has occurred, he is authorized to award relief (see General Statutes §46a-86), the goal of which is to make the complainant whole and place her in the position she would have been absent the respondent’s discriminatory discharge. Saulpaugh v. Monroe Community Hospital, 4 F.3d 134, 144 (2^nd Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 1164 (1994); Worthington v. City of New Haven, 1999 WL 958627 *14 (D.Conn. 1999).

Back pay relief is specifically authorized by General Statutes §46a-86(b). Back pay awards may include commissions, merit increases, and fringe benefits, so long as the complainant can prove, rather than merely speculate, that she would have earned these absent the discriminatory act. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. Joint Apprenticeship Committee of the Joint Industry Board of the Electrical Industry, 186 F.3d 110, 124 (2^nd Cir. 1999); Saulpaugh v. Monroe Community Hospital, supra, 4 F.3d 145. Back pay awards run from the date of termination to the date of judgment.

Although Fucigna appeared to give pay raises more or less on an annual basis, there is no indication that this was the case with Payne. At best, he intimated in January 1997 that if the complainant continued to perform as she had in the previous few weeks, she might get a raise. His comment suggests that raises are, at least in part, rewards for meritorious performance and the complainant’s overall track record with the respondent demonstrates that she is a committed, loyal, and proficient employee. Still, I have little factual basis for determining if, when, and how often the complainant would have received an increase, and how much such increase would have been. The complainant does not press this point; in her damage calculations, she factors in a salary increase of six percent ($1,950) only for 1998. She adds no increases for 1997, when she hoped to receive one, or for 1999, 2000 or beyond. Given the complainant’s history of raises during her first few years of employment, along with Payne’s intimation that she soon might get another increase, I will follow the complainant’s conservative calculations which reflect only a modest raise to $34,450, effective at the beginning of 1998, and no raises thereafter. (See joint post-hearing brief, pp. 37-38.)

Christmas bonuses were given annually and were unrelated to merit; as such, the complainant is entitled to recover these additional damages. The problem, however, is that while the complainant’s past bonuses grew larger each year, there is no evidence allowing me to project the size of her bonuses after December 1996. Therefore, I will assume, for the purposes of these calculations, annual bonuses of $1,250 for 1997, 1998, and 1999, the same amount she received at the end of 1996.

Awarding pre-judgment interest is within the discretion of the court and of this tribunal and should be awarded to restore the complainant to the economic position she would have been in but for her discharge. Gierlinger v. Gleason, 160 F.3d 858, 873 (2^nd Cir. 1998); Worthington v. City of New Haven, supra, 1999 WL 958627 *17; Frank’s Supermarket v. Michaud, Docket No. CV95-549356S, Superior Court, judicial district of Hartford/New Britain at Hartford, pp. 17-18 (April 22, 1996). In fact, according to the Second Circuit, it is "ordinarily an abuse of discretion not to include pre-judgment interest on a back pay award." Saulpaugh v. Monroe Community Hospital, supra, 4 F.3d 145.

This tribunal, like state and federal courts, has the discretion to choose a prejudgment interest calculation designed to make the complainant whole. Silhouette Optical Ltd. v. Commission on Human Rights and Opportunities, Docket No. CV95-520590S, Superior Court, judicial district of Hartford/New Britain at Hartford, p. 21 (January 27, 1994). An appropriate rate of interest, used in other decisions of the commission, is 10%. See General Statutes §37-3a. See Frank’s Supermarket v. Michaud, supra, 18-19 (affirming hearing officer’s award of prejudgment interest at the rate of ten percent); Silhouette Optical Ltd. v Commission, supra, 5, 11 (affirming an award of prejudgment interest at the rate of ten percent); Commission on Human Rights and Opportunities ex rel. Rose v. Payless Shoesource, Inc., CHRO No. 9920353 (November 1, 1999) (FitzGerald, Human Rights Referee). Furthermore, the interest should be compounded, with interest accruing in one year bearing annual interest thereafter. Saulpaugh v. Monroe Community Hospital, supra, 4 F.3d 145; Worthington v. City of New Haven, supra, 1999 WL 958627*17; Frank’s Supermarket v. Michaud, supra, 18-19; Silhouette Optical Ltd. v. Commission, supra, 21-22.

Section 46a-86 does not explicitly provide for an award of front pay. Nevertheless, the courts and this commission have recognized that front pay may be appropriate when reinstatement is not an available remedy and the complainant has not been able to find another position. Reed v. A.W. Lawrence & Co., Inc., 95 F.3d 1170, 1182 (2^nd Cir. 1996); Worthington v. City of New Haven, supra, 1999 WL 958627 *15; State of Connecticut v. Commission on Human Rights and Opportunities, 211 Conn. 464, 478 (1989). The presiding human rights referee has discretion to make such award. Silhouette Optical Ltd. v. Commission, supra, 15-17. In the matter before me, the complainant is not seeking reinstatement, unsurprising given the office environment and her strained (and seemingly irreparable) relationship with Payne. Simply put, reinstatement is not a feasible remedy. However, after holding several part- and full-time positions, she has settled into full-time work for Caliber Solutions, where, although she earns less money than she would have from the respondent, she is comfortable and satisfied. While the complainant has renewed contact with Career Blazers, a job placement agency, and peruses the newspaper and internet for other positions, she does not appear to be making concerted efforts to leave Caliber for something more lucrative. I decline to award front pay to the complainant.

For the first half of the year 2000, there are no records indicating the complainant’s income. I will presume, as the respondent has done, that her salary has not changed. Thus, for the period of January 1 through June 30, 2000, the complainant likely earned $13,960.

The complainant must use reasonable efforts to mitigate her damages by seeking alternative employment after her discharge. Reed v. A.W. Lawrence & Co., supra, 95 F.3d 1182. The respondent, however, bears the burden of proving, as an affirmative defense, that the complainant did not do so. Dailey v. Societe Generale, 108 F.3d 451, 456 (2^nd Cir. 1997). Under the circumstances of this case, I find that the complainant did use reasonable diligence to mitigate her damages.

The complainant worked at various jobs from August 1997 through March 1998. Since then, she has been employed by Caliber Solutions. Although the complainant presently earns less than she would have had she not been discharged, she is content with her work and job atmosphere. Once the complainant accepted a suitable position, she no longer had a duty to continue searching for something better. "The goal of mitigation is to prevent the [complainant] from remaining idle and doing nothing." Raimondo v. Amax, Inc. 843 F.Supp. 806, 809 (D.Conn. 1994).

The respondent argues that the complainant’s inaction between her termination and her employment six months later militates against a damage award for that time. The respondent cites to General Statutes §46a-86(b), which provides that "interim earnings, including . . . amounts which could have been earned with reasonable diligence on the part of the [complainant] shall be deducted from the amount of back pay to which [she] is otherwise entitled." Remaining at home for several months, with a one-week vacation with her parents, should not prevent the complainant from recovering damages from February until August 1997. As the complainant credibly testified, the trauma of working in a hostile environment and the shock of her discharge sufficiently depressed her so that she was not ready to face the vicissitudes of job hunting for several months. Her inability to work or seriously search for a new job was the result of Payne’s behavior, for which she should not be penalized. See Maturo v. National Graphics, Inc. 722 F. Supp. 916, 926 (D.Conn. 1989).

I conclude that the complainant is entitled to the following damages:

1997.    Lost wages                $29,399 ($32,500 – 3,101)
            COBRA payments          1800 (FF 45, n.9)
            Insurance (Aug-Dec)         850 (FF 47, n.10)
            Lost bonus                     1,250 (FF 42)
           SUBTOTAL                 33,299

            Severance pay             -1,240  (FF 43)
            Unemployment comp   -7,916  (FF 45)
            Earnings (Aug-Dec)     -9,934  (FF 50)
            NET DAMAGES       14,379
            TOTAL (w/interest)  $18,032  (compound interest @ 10% from end of year through 6/30/00)

1998.   Lost wages                $34,450 (see discussion above)
            Insurance (Jan-Mar)         510 (FF 47, n. 9)
            Lost bonus                    1,250
            SUBTOTAL               36,210

            Earnings                     -22,328  (FF 51)
            NET DAMAGES        13,882
            TOTAL (w/ interest)  $16,016

1999.   Lost wages                 $34,450
            Insurance¹⁵                     ---
            Lost bonus                     1,250
            SUBTOTAL                35,700

            Earnings                      -27,920 (FF 52)
            NET DAMAGES           7,780
            TOTAL (w/ interest)     $8,160

2000.   Lost wages (Jan-June) $17,225 (one-half of 1999 lost wages)
            Insurance¹⁶                            ---
            SUBTOTAL                17,225

            Earnings (Jan-June)     -13,960 (one half of 1999 interim earnings)
            NET DAMAGES        $3,265 (no interest)

            TOTAL DAMAGES  $45,473 (Feb. 1997 through June 2000)
            (minus offsets)

V. FINAL DECISION AND ORDER

1. The respondent shall pay the complainant the sum of $45,473, in accordance with the conclusions and calculations above.

2. The respondent shall cease and desist from all acts of discrimination prohibited by state or federal law, and shall provide a nondiscriminatory work environment pursuant to state and federal law.

3. The respondent shall post in prominent and accessible locations, visible to all employees and applicants for employment, such notices regarding statutory antidiscrimination provisions as the commission shall provide. The respondent shall post the notices within three working days of their receipt.

4. Should prospective employers seek references concerning the complainant, the respondent shall provide only the dates of said employment, the last position held, and the rate of pay. In the event additional information is requested in connection with any inquiry regarding the complainant, the respondent shall require written authorization from the complainant before such information is provided, unless it is required by law to provide such information.

5. Pursuant to General Statutes §46a-86(b), the respondent shall pay to the commission $7,916, which represents the amount of unemployment compensation paid to the complainant. The commission shall then transfer said amount to the appropriate state or municipal agency.

6. Pursuant to General Statutes §37-3a, the respondent shall pay post-judgment simple interest on the award of damages. Said interest shall accrue daily from the date of this decision on the unpaid balance at the rate of 10% per year.

So ordered this 30th day of June, 2000.

Hon. David S. Knishkowy
Human Rights Referee

c: S. Horner
A. Nemiroff
A. Simonetti
R. Pech

Endnotes: